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            From the Director . . .
The Center for Business and Economic Research (CBER)
is pleased to publish the 35th Kentucky Annual Economic
Report.  This report is one of the important ways that the Center
fulfills its mandated mission to examine various aspects of the
Kentucky economy. The 2007 report contains seven articles.
These articles cover a wide variety of topics from the expected
growth of the state and national economics to an examination
of why Kentucky has long been one of the poorest states in the
country.  A theme of this annual report is an examination of
current issues that face citizens and policy makers in the state
such as: the effectiveness of various policies in promoting the
economic development of the state, the efficiency of the
Kentucky state government, the efficiency of the tax system in
Kentucky, and the impact of possible minimum wage
legislation on workers in Kentucky.
In putting together this issue we have drawn on the expertise
of the faculty, staff and students at the University of Kentucky.
Contributors include six faculty members and one economics
graduate students.  As has been the tradition for this report we
have assembled some of the best economists in the state to write
about important regional and national issues.
Our lead article is by myself along with Kenneth Sanford,
who is a graduate student in the Department of Economics.  This
article examines what factors can account for Kentucky’s persistent
poverty.  One of the striking findings in this report is that Kentucky’s
low stock of knowledge combined with the rural nature of the
state’s economy, can explain much of the difference in income
between Kentucky and the average U.S. state.
The next article, by Dr. David Wildasin an Endowed
Professor of Public Finance in the Martin School of Public Policy
and Administration as well as the Director of the Institute for
Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations, examines the tax
system in Kentucky.  In this article Dr. Wildasin reviews the
status of local government finance in Kentucky and discusses
some of the key findings and recommendations of the Task
Force on Local Taxation.  He points out that informed analysis
of local tax policy in Kentucky is hampered by inadequate data
on local government finances and that this lack of data has
severely limited the recommendations of the Task Force.  He
identifies some of these deficiencies and issues that require
further study if the General Assembly hopes to make sensible
reforms to the tax system.
Dr William Hoyt, a Gatton Endowed Professor of
Economics examines the efficiency of the state and local
governments in Kentucky by comparing spending on programs
in Kentucky with spending on similar programs in neighboring
states.  He finds that per capita state and local spending in
Kentucky is higher because of Kentucky’s smaller population,
more centralized spending and the large number of local
governments in Kentucky.
Another article by me and Dr. Aaron Yelowitz, who is an
Associate Professor of Economics, examines the impact on the
Kentucky economy of raising the minimum wage in Kentucky.
We find that increasing the minimum wage will provide only
a small amount of help to most poor workers, but will result in
a number of workers losing their job.  Increasing the minimum
wage will also cost consumers in Kentucky because of an
increase in costs to business that will
be passed onto consumers in the form
of higher prices.  We suggest that an
alternative method for helping poor
workers would be to adopt a state-level
Earned Income Tax Credit, similar to
what has been done in a number of
other states.
The next two articles are by Dr. Jenny Minier, an Associate
Professor of Economics and Dr. Christopher Jepsen, an
Assistant Professor of Economics and the Associate Director
of CBER.  These articles look back at the performance of the
national and state economies over the recent period and
provide forecasts for the coming year.  The article by Dr. Minier
discusses the national economy and focuses on the good news
and the bad news from the past year.  She concludes that the
future looks fairly positive, with slower but still positive growth
for 2007.
The article by Dr. Jepsen primarily focuses on the
Kentucky economy.  He predicts that the Kentucky economy
will experience growth of slightly below 2% in the coming year,
which is somewhat slower than the predicted growth in the
U.S. economy.  He also expects unemployment to remain fairly
stead at 5% and that inflation in the state will continue to be
moderate, with prices expected to grow by 2.5%.
The final article in the report is written by Anna Stewart,
Senior Economic Analyst at CBER and Vlad Sushko a research
associate at CBER.  In this article Ms. Stewart reports on the
results of the annual survey of business confidence CBER
conducts for the Associated Industries of Kentucky.  This
survey asks businesses about their performance over the past
year and their expectation about the coming year.  Based on
the results from this survey it appears that businesses owners
are relatively optimistic about the economy in the coming year,
but not as optimistic as in the previous year.
In the past year we have worked on a number of important
projects at the Center for Business and Economic Research.
Some of you may have already read about our project for the
Cabinet for Economic Development looking at the impact of
tax incentives on the Kentucky economy.  We have also recently
prepared a report for the Kentucky Office of Energy Policy
examining changes Kentucky may need to make in order to
attract firms in the “new energy” sector.  Finally, we have
looked at spending on education in Kentucky for the Kentucky
Chamber of Commerce.
Change seems to be a fairly constant recent theme at CBER.
As many of you know I completed my first year as Director of
CBER and am now half way through my second year.  In
addition, over the last year we hired a new Associate Director,
Christopher Jepsen.  Chris comes to us from the Public Policy
Institute of California, so he has ample experience doing the
high quality policy relevant work for which CBER in known.
We also lost our full-time research associate, Vlad Sushko, who
left to pursue a graduate degree in economics at the University
of California—Santa Cruz.  However, we have added a number
of new graduate research assistants to the CBER staff who have
provided outstanding assistance throughout the year.
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Dr. Jenny Minier is an Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Kentucky.  She
earned her Ph.D. in economics from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1998, and was a
faculty member at the University of Miami (FL) prior to her appointment at the University  of
Kentucky.  Her research interests include economic growth, technological change, and
international trade.  She is currently working on projects including how to account for
mismeasured determinants of economic growth, the relationship between financial markets and
economic growth in developing countries, and the political economy of U.S. trade policy.  Her
research has been published in journals such as the Journal of Monetary Economics, Review of
Economics and Statistics, and the Journal of Economic Growth.
Dr. William H. Hoyt is Director of Graduate Studies and a Gatton Endowed Professor of Economics
at the University of Kentucky, He was previously Professor, and Associate Professor of Economics at
the University of Kentucky.  Dr. Hoyt received his Ph.D. in economics from the University of Wiscon-
sin-Madison in 1986, at which time he came to Kentucky.  From 1992-3, Dr. Hoyt was an assistant
professor and associate professor in the Department of Economics and Graduate Public Policy Pro-
gram at Georgetown University.  His primary research areas include public finance and urban eco-
nomics.  Dr. Hoyt has received research support from the National Science Foundation, the National
Real Estate Research Center, the Department of Labor, the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, the Kentucky Cabinet for Human Resources, and the Governor’s Office for Policy and Manage-
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Review of Economics and Statistics, Journal of Public Economics, Journal of Urban Economics, Southern Eco-
nomic Journal, National Tax Journal and Regional Science and Urban Economics.
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such as the Journal of Human Resources,
Demography, the Journal of Urban Economics, and the Economics ofEducation Review.
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Dr. Kenneth R. Troske is Director of the Center for Business and Economic Research and William B.
Sturgill Professor of Economics at the University of Kentucky as well as a Research Fellow with the
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn, Germany.  Prior to coming to Kentucky Dr. Troske was
an Assistant and an Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Missouri.  He received his
Ph.D. in economics in 1992 from the University of Chicago.  His primary research areas are labor and
human resource economics.  Dr. Troske has authored a number of widely-known papers utilizing
employer-employee matched data on topics such as productivity, technology, and discrimination.
His most recent work has focused on evaluating various aspects of the Workforce Development
System in the U.S. including the role of temporary help firms in facilitating the transition from welfare-
to-work.  His papers have appeared in many leading journals in economics including the Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Journal of Labor Economics, Journal of Human Resources, Review of Economics and
Statistics, and the American Economic Review.
Dr. David E. Wildasin holds an Endowed Chair in Public Finance in the Martin School of Public
Policy and is also a Professor in the Department of Economics.  He serves as Director of the Institute
for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.  He received a B.A. in Economics from the University
of Virginia and a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Iowa. His teaching and research interests
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his recent research includes work on fiscal policy issues in the context of European economic integration
and on intergovernmental fiscal relations in developing countries.
Mr. Vladyslav Sushko is currently enrolled in the PhD program at the University of California,
Santa Cruz.  Mr. Sushko received a BA in economics with Japanese from the University of Kentucky
in December of 2004.  While at the University of Kentucky, Mr. Sushko worked as a Research
Assistant for the Center for Business and Economic Research.  He has contributed to numerous
articles for CBER including the past two AIK Business Confidence surveys.
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Anna Laura Stewart is an Economic Analyst for the Center for Business and Economic Research.
Ms. Stewart has a B.B.A. in economics from Morehead State University and a M.A. from the
Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky.  Ms.
Stewart provides economic analysis for the Center including economic impact analysis.  Prior to
joining CBER, Ms. Stewart served as a research fellow at the Indiana Economic Development
Council, the economic development research and planning mechanism of the Indiana State
Government. located in Washington, D.C., specializing in local development internationally.
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Dr. Aaron Yelowitz is currently an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at University
of Kentucky. He also is a joint faculty member in the Martin School of Public Policy and Administration
at University of Kentucky. He is also a Research Associate at National Bureau of Economic Research,
a Faculty Affiliate at the Joint Center for Poverty Research, and a Research Associate at Institute for
Research on Poverty, and the economics department liaison for the UK Center for Poverty Research.
He serves as an associate editor for the Journal of Public Economics.
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Local Government Finance in Kentucky: Time for Reform? .....................11
David E. Wildasin
This is a time of increased interest in local government finance in Kentucky, as evidenced by the creation of a Task Force
on Local Taxation, established by the General Assembly.  The final report of the Task Force offers significant
recommendations, including an amendment of the state constitution that would provide the General Assembly with
the flexibility to institute new sources of local revenues.  The present paper reviews the status of local government
finance in Kentucky and discusses some of the key findings and recommendations of the Task Force.  As the Task Force
report clearly recognizes, informed analysis of local tax policy in Kentucky is hampered by inadequate data on local
government finances.  This paper identifies some of these deficiencies, as well as a number of important policy issues
that require further policy analysis, particularly if the General Assembly entertains significant reforms of local taxation.
Differences in State and Local Government Spending between Kentucky
and its Neighbors: How Much and Why? .......................................................23
William Hoyt
Politicians, citizen watchdogs groups, the media, and voters all frequently express concerns about state and local
government spending, particularly if they feel tax dollars are being wasted. While the measurement of government
“waste” is beyond the scope of this study, I offer some comparisons of government spending by function between
Kentucky and its neighboring states. I find that our spending, on a per capita basis, is generally within the range of our
neighbors. In addition, I also examine how spending on a per capita basis varies with some of the characteristics of the
states. I find that per capita state and local government spending in Kentucky is higher than the average of these states
because of its smaller population, more centralized spending, and large number of local governments. However, its
lower average wages and demographics act to reduce its predicted spending.
Why is Kentucky so Poor? A Look at the Factors Affecting Cross-State
Differences in Income..........................................................................................1
Kenneth Sanford & Kenneth Troske
Kentucky has long been one of the poorest states in the country.  In order to change this fact we need to first understand
what factors can explain cross-state differences in income.  In this paper we focus on four factors: differences in the stock
of knowledge in a state; differences in the business climate in the state; state-level differences in infrastructure; and
differences in the industrial structure in the state.  We find that the most important factor determining wealth is a
state’s stock of knowledge—the education level of its residents and the amount of innovative activity that occurs in the
state.  State infra-structure is also an important determinant as is the industrial structure of the state, although to a
lesser degree.  Cross-state differences in business climate do not account for any of the cross-state differences in income.
These results show that if policy makers in Kentucky want to increase income in Kentucky they need to focus on ways
to increase the stock of knowledge in the Commonwealth.
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The Minimum Wage and Kentucky’s Working Poor: Low Hours or Low
Wages? ..................................................................................................................35
Kenneth R. Troske and Aaron Yelowitz
Many policymakers in Kentucky have suggested raising the state’s minimum wage as a way to help poor families. In
this report, we examine which Kentucky workers would be helped and hurt by a $7 minimum wage in Kentucky. The
results indicate that both the poor families, which the minimum wage increase is intended to help, and the state as a
whole would be, if anything, less well off if the wage was raised. We investigate the earned income tax credit as an
alternate method of assisting poor families and find it to be less disruptive and more likely to assist the targeted recipients.
The U.S. Economy in 2006: Mixed Signals .....................................................45
Jenny Minier
The U.S. economy grew at a moderate pace in 2006, despite slowdowns in the housing market and manufacturing
industries.  Strengths included stock market gains and low unemployment.  In this article, I discuss the economic
events of 2006 and their implications for 2007.  I am cautiously optimistic that the economy will continue to grow at
moderate rates into 2007.
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Recent Economic Developments in the United States and Kentucky:
 Implications for 2007 .........................................................................................51
Christopher Jepsen
This article summarizes recent economic developments in the United States and in Kentucky.  It covers the substantial
growth in GDP over the last few years.  The article also looks at labor market conditions, prices including energy prices,
monetary policy, and housing conditions.  Economic conditions in Kentucky are also discussed.  The article concludes
with forecasts for both the nation and Kentucky.  The national economy is expected to grow by more than 2.0% in 2007,
compared to growth in Kentucky of slightly less than 2.0%.
AIK Business Manufacturing Confidence Survey .......................................57
Vladyslav Sushko and Anna Laura Stewart
The Kentucky Manufacturing Business Confidence Survey is produced each year through the joint efforts of the Associated
Industries of Kentucky and the Center for Business and Economic Research. The survey asks businesses to report on their
actual performance over the past year and to make predictions for the next year in areas such as employment, sales, profits,
capital expenditures, and industry production. Among other findings, the 2006 survey reveals that growth remains strong
but that inflation may be distorting business expectations regarding future profits and capital expenditures. In 2006 hiring
conditions were slightly higher than in 2005, and have come a step closer to the robust sales conditions. Both reported sales
and hiring conditions are at their highest since the survey began in 1999.  Future expectations in the manufacturing
sector also indicate that Kentucky manufacturers view their business conditions more favorably than those of the entire
industry. A substantial presence in the number of businesses that do not expect additional growth in the next 12
months suggests that business conditions in the Kentucky manufacturing sector are unlikely to improve any further
during 2007.
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Why is Kentucky so Poor?
A Look at the Factors Affecting Cross-State Differences in Income
Kenneth Sanford & Kenneth Troske
Introduction
Kentucky has long been one of the poorest states
in the country.  In 1939 Kentucky ranked 44th out of
48 states in terms of per capita personal income
(Bauer, Schweitzer and Shane, 2006).  In 1970
Kentucky ranked 44th out of 50 states in terms of per
capita personal income and in 2004 Kentucky was
still the 6th poorest state in the union with a per capita
income of $27,151 compared to the average for the
entire country of $33,041. Using an alternative
measure of income, Gross State Product per capita,
Kentucky also ranks quite low.  In 2004 Kentucky
ranked 41st with a GSP per capita of $32,943. On top
of this already low level of income, Kentucky has
experienced fairly slow growth in output in recent
years.  Between 1997 and 2004 Kentucky had an
average annual growth in real Gross State Product
(GSP) of 1.6 percent, ranking 43rd in terms of growth
in GSP relative to the rest of the states.  Without
increasing the growth in income in the
Commonwealth, it is unlikely that Kentucky will
move from the bottom of the income distribution in
the near future.
One obvious question is, “Are there identifiable
factors that can explain why Kentucky remains mired
at the bottom of the income distribution?”  A number
of factors have been offered to explain Kentucky’s
low income.  One of the more prominent explanations
has been the historically low level of education in
Kentucky.  Clearly this was part of the motivation
behind the Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990
and the Post Secondary Education Reform Act of
1997 (known as HB1).  The education explanation
appears credible since in 2005 Kentucky ranked 49th
in the percent of the adult population with a high
school degree and 47th in the percent of adults with a
college degree.  Other explanations have focused on
Kentucky’s relatively low concentration of “high
technology” employment as a contributor to our low
ranking. Again, this argument is bolstered by a recent
report from the Milken Institute (DeVol and Koepp
2004) in which Kentucky ranks 48th in their State
Technology and Science Index.  More generally, the
overall focus of Kentucky’s economy, which has
historically been concentrated in manufacturing,
mining and agriculture, may explain the poor
performance.  More recently, policy makers have been
examining what is perceived as the poor business
environment in Kentucky, with efforts to lower taxes
on business and to make Kentucky a “Right-to-Work”
state.  Arguments can be made supporting each of
these as a possible reason for the poor performance
of the economy, and it seems likely that all play some
role.  However, before we can develop sound policies
to address the problem of low income in the state, it
is important to determine which factors are the most
important in hindering Kentucky’s growth.
In this paper we present the results from an
analysis examining what factors account for the
largest share of cross-state differences in wealth.  We
focus on four possible explanations for the
differences in wealth across states: differences in the
Kentucky has long been one of the poorest states in the country.  In order to change this fact we
need to first understand what factors can explain cross-state differences in income.  In this paper
we focus on four factors: differences in the stock of knowledge in a state; differences in the business
climate in the state; state-level differences in infrastructure; and differences in the industrial
structure in the state.  We find that the most important factor determining wealth is a state’s stock
of knowledge—the education level of its residents and the amount of innovative activity that
occurs in the state.  State infra-structure is also an important determinant as is the industrial
structure of the state, although to a lesser degree.  Cross-state differences in business climate do
not account for any of the cross-state differences in income.  These results show that if policy
makers in Kentucky want to increase income in Kentucky they need to focus on ways to increase
the stock of knowledge in the Commonwealth.
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stock of knowledge in a state; differences in the
business climate in the state; state-level differences
in infrastructure; and differences in the industrial
structure in the state.  We draw on data from a
number of different sources covering the period from
1969-2004.  We use the results from our analysis to
see how changes in various aspects of the Kentucky
economy are predicted to change the wealth of the
citizens of Kentucky.  The results from our analysis
provide a guide to policy makers in Kentucky on what
issues to focus on when addressing the persistent
problem of low income in the state.
Measures of Income and the Possible
Factors Affecting Income
What we ultimately are interested in understanding
is differences in the ability of citizens in a state to
produce goods and services in a year—what is
commonly called income.  To do this we measure
income in a state as per capita Gross State Product
(GSP).  This measure of aggregate economic activity
is strongly correlated with per capita personal income
but personal income includes net transfers for
various social assistance programs while GSP does
not include these transfers. Since transfer payments
represent payments to citizens in a state because they
have low income and not because they are more
productive, we do not want to include transfer
payments in our measure of income.  Ultimately it is
difference in per  capita GSP which measure
differences in productivity in a state, so we will focus
on this measure when analyzing the determinants
of income in a state.
We consider four possible
explanations for Kentucky’s low
productivity; differences between
Kentucky and other states in: the
stock of knowledge; the business
climate; state-level infrastructure;
and the state’s industrial structure.
We use three different variables to
capture the stock of knowledge in
a state: the percent of individuals
25 years old and older with a high
school degree; the percent of
individuals 25 years old and older
with a college degree, and the stock
of patents per capita.  We use the
stock of patents per capita as a
measure of the stock of knowledge as patents are a
commonly used measure of technology or innovation.
If a state is more innovative then we expect companies
in that state to use more productive techniques and
therefore tend to produce more output.  To construct
the stock of patents per capita variable for a state we
start by obtaining yearly data on the number of patent
issues in a state per year for the period 1963-2004.1
We treat the number of patent issues in 1963 as the
stock of patents in the state in that year.  To estimate
the stock of patents in a state in 1964 we depreciate
the stock in 1963 by 5 percent and add the total
number of new patent issues in the state in 1964.2
We then repeat this step every year to obtain our
estimate of the stock of patents for a given year.  We
then divide this stock by the total population in a
state in a year to adjust for differences in the size of a
state.3 Annual estimates of the percent of the
population 25 years of age and older with a high
school diploma and college degree for 1969 through
2004 were constructed from the March supplement
of the Current Population Survey.4
We will use three variables to capture the
business climate in a state—total personal income
taxes collected in a year divided by total income in
the state; total business taxes collected in a state
divided by total income in the state, and a variable
indicating whether the state is a right-to-work state
in a year.5   We have included a measure of personal
income taxes as a measure of business climate because
previous research has shown that business owners
care about personal income taxes as much, if not more,
than business taxes when deciding where to locate
$15,000
$20,000
$25,000
$30,000
$35,000
$40,000
1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004
Year
Kentucky Border States US
Figure 1: Real Gross State Product Per Capita
(2000 dollars)
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their business (Hoyt and Harden, 2005).  Right-to-
work laws ban union or closed workplaces.  Many
view this legislation as pro-business since it weakens
the bargaining power of unions.  Our measure will
indicate whether a state has passed right-to work
legislation prior to a given year.
We measure the infrastructure in a state using
two variables, the percent of a state’s population
living in an urban area and the stock of highway
capital per capita.  Highway capital is a commonly
used measure of infrastructure.  To construct our
estimate of the stock of highway capital in a state we
start by obtaining data on annual highway capital
expenditures in a state for the period 1950-2004.6  We
then use the same technique we used when
constructing the stock of patents in a state.  In
particular, we treat a state’s capital expenditures on
highways in 1950 as our estimate of the stock of
highway capital in 1950.  To estimate the stock of
highway capital in 1951, we depreciate the stock from
1950 by 5 percent and then add total expenditures
on highways in 1951.  We then repeat these steps
every year to obtain our annual estimate of highway
capital in a state.  We then divide by the population
of a state in a given year to adjust this measure for
differences in the population of a state. The percent
of population living in an urban area will help
identify positive or negative agglomeration effects,
that is, how state population density affects growth.7
To capture the industrial structure of a state we
will measure the percent of the state’s workforce in
the following industries: agriculture; mining;
construction; transportation; wholesale trade; retail
trade; finance, insurance and real estate; and
government.8
Throughout our analysis we are going to
concentrate on the period from 1969 to 2004.  We
focus on this period primarily due to data
restrictions, for many of our variables we simply
do not have data earlier than 1969.  However, this
is also a period which has seen a number of
significant changes in the structure of the
economy, so this is a good period to study.
Because a number of our variables are frequently
missing for Alaska and Hawaii, we have dropped
these states from the analysis and focus on cross-
state differences in productivity among the 48
contiguous U.S. states.
Comparing Trends in Kentucky with
the U.S. and the Region
We start our analysis with Figure 1 which
plots real per capita GSP for Kentucky from 1969-
2004 as well as average real per capita GSP over
this period for all 50 states and for the states that
boarder Kentucky—Tennessee, Missouri, Ohio,
Illinois, Indiana, Virginia and West Virginia.9  This
figure makes clear that while GSP per capita has
risen in Kentucky over this time period, it has risen
at a faster rate for the nation as a whole as well as
in the surrounding states.  This means that, relative
to the typical state in the U.S. and the typical
boarder state, output per person in Kentucky is
lower now than 30 years ago.
Next we examine our three measures capturing
the stock of knowledge in a state.  We start with
Figure 2 which presents the percent of
adults in the state with at least a high
school diploma.  We can see in this
figure that while Kentucky has seen an
increase in the share of adults in the
state with a high school diploma, we
still have a smaller share of adults with
a high school degree than the typical
state.  In addition, we can see that the
share of adults with a high school
diploma in our border states has
actually risen relative to the U.S. and
by 2004 a larger percentage of adults
in these states have a high school
diploma compared with the typical
state.
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Figure 2: Percent of Population Age 25 and
Older With a High School Diploma
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Figure 3 shows the percent of
adults with a college degree in
Kentucky, in the states bordering
Kentucky and in the entire country.
Here we see that while the percent of
adults with a college degree has risen
in Kentucky, it has risen by a slower
rate than it has in the rest of the
country, so that by 2004 Kentucky lags
even further behind the typical state
than we did in 1970.  Since less
educated workers tend to be less
productive, the relatively low level of
educational attainment in Kentucky is
likely to be a significant factor in
accounting for the low productivity of
Kentucky workers. Also of note is the
convergence Kentucky has
experienced in population of high
school graduates as compared the US,
versus the lack of convergence in
college degree holders as compared to
the US. If the percent of the population
with a college degree matters with
respect to GSP per capita growth,
Kentucky’s lack of convergence to
national levels might be a primary
contributor to the Commonwealth’s
low per capita GSP.
Figure 4 presents patent stock per
capita for Kentucky, the border states
and in the average state in the U.S.  This
figure shows that Kentucky ranks
far below the average state in the
U.S. and the average border state
in terms of the stock of patent per-
capita.  One interesting item seen
in this figure is that the years from
1969-1976 and the years from 1995
to 2004 are periods in which there
was a significant increase in the
amount of innovation occurring in
the country.  However, it appears
that Kentucky did not experience
higher growth in innovative
activity in either of these periods.
The large and growing gap in
patent capital between Kentucky
and other states also appears to be
a likely explanation for the slow
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Figure 3: Percent of Population Age 25 and Older
With a College Degree
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Figure 4: Stock of Patents Per Capita
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Figure 5: Corporate Net Income Tax Revenue as a
Percent of Total Personal Income
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growth in GSP per capita in
Kentucky.
In Figures 5 and 6 we examine
the sources of income tax-based
revenues for Kentucky, its
bordering states and the US. In
Figure 5, we can see that Kentucky
annual corporate net income taxes
as a percent of total personal
income rose between 1969 and
1974, but has fallen fairly steadily
since 1974, and now lies below the
1969 rate. Figure 6 reflects common
trends in both Kentucky and other
US states average taxes over recent
history. Personal income tax
revenues at the state level appear
to be increasing faster than total
personal income. When viewed
together, the two graphs indicate
that over the past 35 years the bulk
of the growth in taxation at the
state level has come from
increases in personal income
taxes rather than by from
increases in corporate tax
revenue.  If high rates of personal
income taxes do slow growth in a
state, then Kentucky’s position as
a relatively high tax state may
help account for Kentucky’s
slower growth in income over this
period.
In Figures 7 and 8 we look at
industry structures as an
explanation for differences in state
productivity. Two industries that
we believe might influence the
aggregate output of a state are
manufacturing and financial
services. Figure 7 indicates that
while there has been a decrease in
manufacturing employment as a
percent of total over the past 35
years in Kentucky, the region and
the country as a whole, the decline
in Kentucky is much smaller than
the decline in the entire U.S. and in
the border states.  The national
decline in manufacturing
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Figure 6: Personal Income Tax Revenue as a Percent
of Total Personal Income
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Figure 7: Share of Total Employment in Manufacturing
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Figure 8: Share of Total Employment in
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate
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employment is typically associated with increases
in productive technologies that result in higher
output per worker and, holding output fixed, fewer
workers. Kentucky’s relatively large manufacturing
segment suggests that Kentucky has less
technologically advanced manufacturing compared
with neighboring states. Figure 8 presents the percent
employment in finance, insurance and real estate
(FIRE) over time. Although in both Kentucky and the
border states FIRE employment has trended upward
over time the Commonwealth lags bordering states.
Since workers in FIRE tend to be more productive
than workers in other industries, Kentucky’s
persistently low share of workers in FIRE is another
potential explanation for Kentucky’s low
productivity.
In Figures 9 and 10 we present
the trends in our two variables
measuring state infrastructure.
Figure 9 shows the percent of a
state’s population living in an
urban area.  This figure shows quite
clearly that, relative to the typical
state in the U.S. or the typical border
state, Kentucky has always had a
much smaller share of its
population living in cities and there
has been very little change in this
relative difference over time. Since
workers in urban areas tend to have
access to more productive capital
than workers in rural areas, the fact
that Kentucky has more rural
residents is another factor that can help account for
Kentucky’s low productivity.
Figure 10 shows the stock of highway capital
per capita.  This figure shows that Kentucky spends
more money per capita than either the typical state
in the country or in the region, and that this difference
in highway expenditure has been increasing over
time.  This means that by 2004, Kentucky has a
significantly higher stock of highway capital per-
capita than the average state.  Whether this helps or
hurts Kentucky depends on whether money spent
on highways is always productive.
Based on our graphical analysis it appears that
a number of different factors could explain
Kentucky’s relatively low income.  In order to quantify
the effect of each factor and to determine which
factors have the largest impact, we
turn to regression analysis.  We
undertake this analysis in the next
section.
Accounting for the
Differences in GSP Per
Capita
We use ordinarily least
squares regression analysis to
examine factors which account for
the differences across states in
output per person.  The regression
model presented is based on neo-
classical growth theory and is
similar to the regression model in
Bauer, Schweitzer and Shane
(2006).  The log of GSP per capita is
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Figure 9: Percent of Population Living
in an Urban Area
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Figure 10: Stock of Highway Capital
Per Capita
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the dependent variable and the set of independent
variables include measures used to capture state
differences in: stock of knowledge; business climate;
state infrastructure; and industrial structure.
Following a standard neo-classical growth model,
we also include a lag of the dependent variable in
the regression.  Finally, in order to capture
unmeasured differences across states and over time,
we include state and year fixed effects in the
regression. Our estimation, which includes state and
time controls with a lagged dependent variable on
the right-side of the equation does create some
statistical problems; however, the long time period
used in our analysis limits the degree of such
problems.
Another concern about this regression is that
some of the variables may be contemporaneously
correlated with the error term in the regression, which
would result in biased estimates of the coefficients.
Following the analysis in Bauer, Schweitzer and
Shane (2006) we use a five year lag for all the
independent variables (except for the state and year
fixed effects) to adjust for this dependence.  Given
the structure of this model, the interpretation of the
coefficients on the independent variables is how
changes in the value of the variable affect state-level
productivity five years later.
The results from our regression are presented in
Table 1.  The numbers in parenthesis are the standard
errors of the estimates and the stars next to the
coefficients indicate the statistical significance of the
estimate.  In order to simplify the table we do not
report the coefficient estimates for the state or year
fixed effects.
Table 1: Regression Estimates
(All variables are 5-year lags)
Variables Coefficient       (SE)
Knowledge Variables.............................................................................
Patent Capital per capita ................................................................. 42.755*** (6.940)
Percent of adults with high school diploma ......................................... 0.117* (0.069)
Percent of adults with college degree ................................................. 0.389*** (0.098)
Business Climate Variables ..................................................................
Total Corp. taxes divided by total personal income ............................ -0.231 (1.439)
Personal Inc taxes divided by total personal income ........................... 1.092** (0.525)
State is Right-to-Work State .............................................................. -0.041*** (0.014)
State Infrastructure Variables ...............................................................
Highway Capital $000’s per capita .................................................... -0.068*** (0.009)
Percent Urban Population ....................................................................................................................0.275** (0.113)
Industrial Structure Variables ...............................................................
Agriculture as a percent of total state non-farm employment ............... 4.383*** (1.567)
Mining as a percent of total state non-farm employment ..................... -1.159*** (0.333)
Construction as a percent of total state non-farm employment ............ -0.403 (0.352)
Manufacturing as a percent of total state non-farm employment ......... -0.387** (0.170)
Transp. and utilities as a percent of total state non-farm employment .. 2.341*** (0.692)
Wholesale trade as a percent of total state non-farm employment ...... -0.005 (0.592)
Retail trade as a percent of total state non-farm employment .............. 0.782** (0.320)
FIRE as a percent of total state non-farm employment ........................ 1.949*** (0.348)
Government as a percent of total state non-farm employment ............ -0.731*** (0.231)
Additional Controls................................................................................
5-year lagged GSP per capita ............................................................ 0.296** (0.036)
Observations................................................................................ 1488
R-squared .......................................................................................... 0.99
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Regression also includes time and state controls.
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The first three rows in Table 1 list the coefficients
on the variables measuring the stock of knowledge
in the state.  As is shown, all three variables are
positive and statistically significant—states that have
more educated workers and a higher stock of patents
per capita are more productive.  This is hardly
surprising since it is quite similar to the findings from
other research (e.g. Bauer, Schweitzer and Shane,
2006).  Given that Kentucky ranks low in all three
measures, these results help explain why Kentucky
is a low productivity state.
Our next three variables capture the business
climate in the state.  Here we have what might be
viewed as surprising results.  First we see that
corporate income tax revenue relative to total
personal income is not significantly related to state
productivity.  While it might seem surprising that
the level of corporate taxes in a state is not strongly
related to wealth in a state, it is consistent with
previous research examining the relationship
between corporate taxes and state growth (Hoyt and
Hardin, 2005).
We also see that personal tax revenue as a share
of total personal income is positively related to output
per person in a state.  While this result is difficult to
interpret since we have not included any measures
of state expenditures other than highway
expenditures, one explanation might be that states
with more productive workers can afford to provide
higher levels of government services.
The final measure of business climate is the
variable indicating whether the state is a right-to-
work state.  The negative coefficient on this variable
shows that states that became right-to-work states
tended to experience slower growth after adopting
right-to-work legislation.
The next two variables capture differences in
state infrastructure.  The coefficient on the variable
measuring the stock of highway capital is negative
and significant showing that, conditional on tax
revenue, states that have spent more on their
highways are less productive.  The likely explanation
is that states that spend more on highways tend to
spend less on productivity enhancing items such as
education.  The coefficient on the urban population
variable shows that states with a large percentage of
urban residents, on average, experience higher
output per capita.  Since Kentucky has a relatively
large amount of highway capital and a relatively
large rural population, these findings also help
explain why Kentucky remains a poor state relative
to other states in the country.
The final set of variables measure the industrial
structure of the state.  While a number of these
coefficients are significant, two are notable.  First, the
coefficient on the share of workers in manufacturing
is negative showing that states with a large share of
workers in manufacturing are less productive.  In
contrast, the positive coefficient on FIRE employment
shows that states with a large share of employment
in this industry are more productive.  Since Kentucky
has an above average share of workers in
manufacturing and a below average share of workers
in FIRE, these results again account for Kentucky’s
low wealth.
While the regression analysis suggests there are
a number of variables that can account for Kentucky’s
low productivity, the results in Table 1 do not show
Table 2: Impact on 2004 Gross State Product Per Capita in Kentucky
By Changing Variables
 
 Gross State Product Percent of
 Per Capita U.S. Average
Actual Value in Kentucky in 2004 32,145 85%
Predicted Value in Kentucky in 2004 if Kentucky Had the U.S. Average of:
Stock of Knowledge 36,100 96%
Business Environment 32,063 85%
Infrastructure 34,894 93%
Industrial Structure 33,379 88%
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which variables account for the largest share of the
difference between Kentucky and the typical state in
output per person.  To examine which of our variables
have the biggest impact on GSP per capita, Table 2
shows how GSP per capita in Kentucky in 2004
would be predicted to change based on the results of
our regression if we change the values of our various
sets of variables.  The first row of this table shows
that the actual value of per capita GSP in Kentucky
was $32,145 in 2004, which was 82 percent of average
per capita GSP in the U.S.  Row 3 shows that our
regression model predicts that GSP per capita in
Kentucky in 2004 would have been $36,100, and 96
percent of the U.S. average, if Kentucky had the same
stock of patent capital, the same percent of adults
with a high school diploma and the same percent of
adults with a college degree as the average state in
the U.S.  By varying these three variables we would
expect output per person in Kentucky to rise by over
12 percent.  This represents a large increase in overall
productivity.  Looking at the rest of Table 2 shows
that a state’s stock of knowledge has the largest
impact on the wealth in the state.
The next row of Table 2 shows that changing the
variables measuring the business environment in the
state—personal and corporate taxes as a share of
personal income and whether the state is a right-to-
work state—has very little impact on the wealth of
the state.  In contrast, row 5 shows that if we reduce
the stock of highway capital in the state and increase
the percent of individuals living in urban areas to
the U.S. average—that is change the infrastructure of
Kentucky—then the model predicts GSP per capita
in Kentucky would jump to $34,894 or to 93 percent
of the U.S. average.  These variables are predicted to
have the second largest impact on state productivity.
Finally, if we gave Kentucky the same industrial
structure as the average U.S. state then the model
predicts Kentucky would have GSP per capita of
$33,379, which is a 4 percent increase in output per
person.
To summarize, the analysis in Table 2 shows
that the variables measuring the stock of knowledge
in the state are estimated to have the greatest impact
on a state’s productivity.  The variables measuring a
state’s infrastructure are also predicted to have a
significant impact on productivity in a state.  Finally,
a state’s industrial structure also has some impact
on a state’s productivity, but the variables we use to
capture the business climate in a state do not appear
to have any impact on wealth in the state.
Conclusion
Kentucky has been one of the poorest and least
productive states in the country for as long as we
have been recording these statistics.  The results in
this study show that changing Kentucky’s ranking
requires some dramatic changes in the state’s
economy.  To begin with, Kentucky will need to
increase the stock of knowledge in the state by
increasing the amount of innovative research
occurring in the state and by significantly increasing
the educational level of workers in the state, and in
particular, increasing the number of college educated
workers.  These changes will only occur if
Kentuckians begin to realize the fundamental
importance of education and research in creating
wealth, and begin placing much greater emphasis
on these activities.  Kentucky will also need to change
how it spends its money by reducing the share of
spending on roads and highways in the state and
increasing the share of spending on productive
activities such as education.  In addition, there needs
to be an increased emphasis on urbanization in the
state if Kentucky hopes to increase its relative wealth.
Finally, Kentucky will have to place greater emphasis
on newer, more innovative industries such as the
information and financial industries.  Unless the
citizens of Kentucky undertake these fundamental
changes Kentucky will continue to be one of the
poorest states in the Union.
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Footnotes
1 These data are available from the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office.  We use data on Utility patents
issued since these are patents issues for process or
product innovation.
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2 The state where the patent is issued is identified using
the patent owner’s state of residence.
3 This method is identical to the method used in a similar
study by Bauer, Schweitzer and Shane (2006). The same
protocol is also used to determine the stock of highway
capital.
4 In the early 1970’s the CPS does not allow for the unique
identification of some states with small populations.
Instead, the CPS created regions for these years. For
these years, the non-uniquely identified states are
assigned the value of the region.
5 Tax variables were obtained from the U.S. Census
Bureau’s State Government Finances Historical
Database; Right-to-work data were obtained from the
National Institute for Labor Relations Research.
6 These data are available from the U.S. Census Bureau’s
State Government Finances Historical Database.
7 U.S. Census Bureau’s Decennial Census of Population.
Intercensal estimates of population density were
linearly interpolated.
8 Bureau of Economic Analysis: Regional Economic
Information Systems (REIS) data.
9 Throughout this report we have adjusted all dollars
for inflation using the U.S. GDP-Price Index.  All dollars
are reported in constant 2000 dollars.
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Local Government Finance in Kentucky:
Time for Reform?
David E. Wildasin*
1.  Introduction
As all Kentuckians are aware, tax reform in the
Commonwealth has been the focus of concerted
attention in the past few years.  We have already
seen significant modifications of the state’s tax
structure, including such noteworthy changes as the
elimination of the corporation license tax.  Possible
reform of local government taxation is now on the
agenda:  a Tax Force on Local Taxation, established
in 2005 by House Bill 272, has devoted a year of effort
to the study of local tax issues and has recently (June,
2006) issued its final report.    What are some of the
concerns that have prompted this examination of
local government finance?  What has the Task Force
proposed?  What issues require further analysis?  The
issuance of the Task Force report makes this an
opportune time to review the status of local
government finance in Kentucky, to examine the
findings and recommendations of the Task Force, and
to consider some of the policy options facing the
citizens of the Commonwealth.  These are the goals
of the present paper.
Because of the complexity of local government
structure and financing, Section 2 begins with a
concise overview of the system of local government
finance in Kentucky.  This system is an outgrowth of
a body of constitutional and statutory control and
regulation of local governments which define the
taxing powers of these units of government.  Section
3 describes the most important of these constraints
and discusses some of their possible effects.  With
this background, Section 4 turns to a review the Task
Force report.  Section 5 concludes.
2. Local Government Structure and
Finance in Kentucky and the Nation
As is true in many states, the system of local
government finance in Kentucky is a somewhat
intricate affair.  There are many types of local
governments, performing an extraordinary variety
of tasks, and deriving revenues from many diverse
sources.  The great British economist Alfred Marshall
is purported to have said that “all short statements
about economics, with the possible exception of this,
are false;” the same can certainly be said about local
government finance.  Still, it is important to see the
forest for the trees.  At the risk of some
oversimplification, this section begins with a review
of some of the key elements of local government
structure and finance in Kentucky and relates these
to the rest of the nation.1
This is a time of increased interest in local government finance in Kentucky, as evidenced by the
creation of a Task Force on Local Taxation, established by the General Assembly.  The final report
of the Task Force offers significant recommendations, including an amendment of the state
constitution that would provide the General Assembly with the flexibility to institute new sources
of local revenues.  The present paper reviews the status of local government finance in Kentucky
and discusses some of the key findings and recommendations of the Task Force.  As the Task Force
report clearly recognizes, informed analysis of local tax policy in Kentucky is hampered by
inadequate data on local government finances.  This paper identifies some of these deficiencies, as
well as a number of important policy issues that require further policy analysis, particularly if
the General Assembly entertains significant reforms of local taxation.
* This paper extends some of the material presented by the author
to the Task Force on Local Government Taxation in November,
2005.  While taking sole responsibility for the views expressed
and for any errors or omissions, I thank staff from the Legislative
Research Commission and from the Governor's Office for
Economic Analysis for helpful comments and discussion.
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2.1 Structure and Financing of Local
Government in Kentucky: A Concise
Summary
Types of Local Governments. First, it is important
to realize that there are many different types of local
government in Kentucky, as in all states.  Of greatest
importance are Kentucky’s counties, municipalities,
school districts, and “special districts.”
Kentucky is a “county-rich” state: its 120
counties, serving a population of just 4.1 million, have
a mean population of only about 35,000.  There are
several large counties, and these contain a large
fraction of the state’s total population; the remainder
thus have quite modest numbers of residents.  (By
way of contrast, the state of California has only about
half as many counties (58), with a total state
population of about 36.1 million – over 600,000
residents per county.)  Counties play a particularly
important role in providing public services outside
of municipal boundaries, in regulating land use and
development, and as administrative units of
government.
Kentucky’s 433 municipalities vary widely in
size.  They are grouped into 6 administrative classes,
based mainly on population. Louisville/Jefferson
County is the only city of the “first class” in the state.
Cities with populations between 20,000 and 100,000
and Lexington/Fayette County, a total of 13
altogether, constitute the second class. There are 19
third class cities (8,000-20,000 population) and more
than 100 cities each in the fourth, fifth, and sixth
classes.  The last of these classes consists of 176 cities
with populations under 1,000.  Municipalities are
important providers of public services within their
boundaries.
Public education services are provided by nearly
200 local school districts in Kentucky.  To a much
greater degree than other local units of government,
school districts depend on state government
financial assistance, which accounts for about half
of aggregate school district revenues.   This financial
assistance is delivered through a complex formula
system that presumably attempts to achieve some
state educational policy goals, and a discussion of
school district financing therefore quickly becomes
entangled in issues of educational policy.  These
issues go beyond the scope of the present essay,
which is limited to some general remarks about the
overall structure of state/local financing for
education and about the advantages and
disadvantages of more or less decentralization of
education finance.  (For further discussion of school
finance, see Wildasin (2001, pp. 90-101).)
Another important but very heterogeneous
category of local governments in Kentucky are the
so-called “special districts.”  These units, sometimes
created as sub-entities of other localities, provide park,
flood control, transportation, fire, emergency,
sanitation, health, and other services.  According to
the 2002 Census of Governments, Kentucky has 720
special districts.  This count, however, excludes
numerous other agencies and authorities which, to
some degree, fall under the control of other units of
government but which also possess some degree of
independent authority, including the authority to
issue debt.
Revenue Sources for Local Governments. In
general, local governments in Kentucky depend upon
property taxes, “occupational license” taxes
(imposed on the earnings of individuals and on the
incomes of businesses), and taxes on insurance
premiums as their principal sources of tax revenue.
School districts derive revenues from taxes imposed
on the gross receipts of utilities; as of 2005, this tax,
formerly collected at the local level, is administered
at the state level with proceeds transferred to school
districts.  Taxes on telecommunications, also
previously imposed by local governments, are now
collected at the state level as well, with revenues paid
out to localities in amounts corresponding to
previous local collections.  Local governments also
rely on various nontax sources of revenue and on
transfers from the state government; the latter are
particularly important for school districts.
The key features of this system of finance are
readily summarized.  In order to provide some
quantitative perspective, Table 1 provides basic data
on the financing of local government and of state
and local government combined for Kentucky and
for all state and local governments in the US for 2003-
2004.
First, Kentucky has a relatively centralized system
of finance: local governments raise only 40% of total
state/local revenues, compared to the US average of
58%.  In Kentucky, the state government is “large”
relative to local governments.
Second, state aid to local governments in
Kentucky is not markedly different from that in the
rest of the nation: 44% of local government revenue
derives from intergovernmental transfers, compared
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TABLE 1: Level and Composition of State and Local Government Revenues,
 Kentucky and U.S., 2003-2004
(Dollar figures in thousands.)
Kentucky
Revenues, State & local Share of Share of own- Share of Share of Share of own-
type government general source tax general source Share of
combined revenue general  revenue Local revenue general  tax
(%) revenue(%) government (%) revenue (%) revenue
General revenue 22,982,302 100% 9,184,914 100%
Intergovernmental revenue 6,241,782 27% 4,030,875 44%
     From Federal Government 347,912 4%
     From State government 3,682,963 40%
General revenue from own sources 16,740,520 73% 100% 5,154,039 56% 100%
    Taxes 11,460,494 50% 68% 100% 2,997,094 33% 58% 100%
          Property 2,136,455 19% 1,680,995 56%
          Sales and gross receipts 4,313,337 38% 307,030 10%
               General sales 2,477,717 22% 11,684 0%
               Selective sales 1,835,620 16% 295,346 10%
                    Motor fuel 476,605 4% - 0%
                    Alcoholic beverage 79,104 1% - 0%
                    Tobacco products 20,627 0% - 0%
                    Public utilities 207,280 2% 207,280 7%
                    Other selective sales 1,052,004 9% 88,066 3%
          Individual income 3,629,392 32% 809,999 27%
          Corporate income 381,538 3% - 0%
          Motor vehicle license 207,904 2% 2,590 0%
          Other taxes 791,868 7% 196,480 7%
     Charges and misc. general  revenue 5,280,026 23% 32% 2,156,945 23% 42%
United States Total
Revenues, State & local Share ofShare of own- Share of Share of Share of own-
type government general source tax general source Share of
combined revenue general  revenue Local revenue general  tax
(%) revenue(%) government (%) revenue (%) revenue
General revenue 1,889,740,590 100% 1,094,729,372 100%
Intergovernmental revenue 425,682,586 23% 430,114,245 39%
     From Federal Government 50,988,684 5%
     From State government 379,125,561 35%
General revenue from own sources 1,464,058,004 77% 100% 664,615,127 61% 100%
    Taxes 1,010,277,275 53% 69% 100% 419,863,497 38% 63% 100%
          Property 318,242,461 32% 307,528,431 73%
          Sales and gross receipts 360,628,892 36% 67,303,155 16%
               General sales 244,891,334 24% 46,942,486 11%
               Selective sales 115,737,558 11% 20,360,669 5%
                    Motor fuel 34,943,572 3% 1,181,153 0%
                    Alcoholic beverage 4,985,706 0% 392,410 0%
                    Tobacco products 12,625,780 1% 322,515 0%
                    Public utilities 21,426,576 2% 10,717,400 3%
                    Other selective sales 41,755,924 4% 7,747,191 2%
          Individual income 215,214,667 21% 18,959,532 5%
          Corporate income 33,715,793 3% 3,486,756 1%
          Motor vehicle license 18,708,983 2% 1,372,855 0%
          Other taxes 63,766,479 6% 21,212,768 5%
   Charges and misc. general  revenue 453,780,729 24% 31% 244,751,630 22% 37%
Source: Bureau of the Census
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to 39% for the nation as a whole. As is true for other
states, transfers from the Federal government are not
a very substantial source of local government
revenues in Kentucky.
Third, turning now to the composition of own-
source revenues (i.e., revenues other than transfers
from higher-level governments), note to begin with
that Kentucky’s localities depend heavily on nontax
sources of revenue, which account for fully 42% of
all local government own-source revenues.  In this
respect, Kentucky’s localities are somewhat less tax-
dependent than local governments elsewhere, which
obtain 37% of their own-source revenues from nontax
sources.
Fourth, property taxes are the most important
source of tax revenue for localities in Kentucky,
accounting for about 58% of all local taxes.  This figure
is much lower in Kentucky, however, than in the rest
of the nation, where localities obtain almost three-
fourths (73%) of their tax revenues from property
taxes.  Kentucky localities differ quite dramatically
from those elsewhere in that they raise more than
one-fourth (27%) of their tax revenues from
“occupational license taxes,” treated for Census
purposes as a form of income tax.  Note that general
sales taxes account for significant amounts of local
government revenues in the US as a whole.  At
present, localities in Kentucky are not permitted to
utilize such taxes and therefore derive no revenues
from them.
Local Taxation in Kentucky and the US. Putting
some of these basic facts together, it is apparent that
Kentucky’s combined system of state and local
government finance differs from the rest of the nation
in two important and related respects.  First,
government revenues in Kentucky depend heavily
on state-level taxation, with relatively little revenue
derived from local governments.  Secondly,
Kentucky’s fiscal system depends comparatively
heavily on individual income taxation and is less
property-tax dependent than other states.  In fact, in
their relative importance, individual income and
property taxes in Kentucky are almost precisely an
inversion of the national average:  in Kentucky,
property and income taxes account for 19% and 32%,
respectively, of combined state/local tax revenues,
whereas the corresponding figures for the nation are
32% and 21%.   The extra share of income taxes in
Kentucky arises entirely from local taxation: at the
state government level alone, individual taxes
account for 32% of total tax revenues both in Kentucky
and for all state governments in the nation as a
whole.  This testifies to the important and rather
unique role of “occupational license taxes’ in local
government finance in Kentucky.
In summary, compared to national averages,
Kentucky’s combined state/local fiscal system is
“over-weighted” at the state level and “under-
weighted” at the local level, and it is “over-
weighted” toward income taxation and “under-
weighted” toward property taxation, mainly because
of the heavy dependence of localities on occupational
license taxes.  These characteristics of Kentucky’s
fiscal system are of long-standing and have been
amply documented in other studies, including
Boardman (2006), Hoyt (2001), Martie (2001), and
Wildasin (2001).
2.2 Potential Structural Reforms
Differences between Kentucky’s fiscal system
and those found elsewhere in the nation provide no
a priori indication that Kentucky’s policies are better
or worse than those found elsewhere.  To begin with,
policymakers and voters in different states and
localities may select different policies because these
jurisdictions differ in their economic structure,
population characteristics, and other fundamental
attributes.  They may also have different policy
preferences.  And, finally, there is no magic formula
that dictates what system of taxation is “best” for
any one level of government or for a state and local
fiscal system.   Nevertheless, comparisons of fiscal
systems can usefully highlight important
distinctions and suggest potentially fruitful lines of
analysis.  They also indicate likely feasible (though
not necessarily desirable) avenues of policy reform.
On the basis of the simple comparisons just
provided, there is a reasonable presumption that
Kentucky’s localities could, if desired, assume
greater responsibility for financing public services
and that the state government could reduce the
overall level of revenues that it collects.  It is important
to remember, however, that localities in Kentucky
are no more heavily dependent on state government
fiscal transfers than localities in other states, that is,
the lower level of local revenue collection in
Kentucky is accompanied by lower levels of local
relative to state government expenditures.  Thus, if
Kentucky were to attempt to mimic the national
average fiscal balance between state and local
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governments, “decentralization” on the revenue side
(increasing the weight of local relative to state taxes)
would have to be accompanied by comparable
decentralization on the expenditure side.
This immediately raises a fundamental issue,
sometimes called “the assignment problem” in the
literature of fiscal federalism: which government
responsibilities are or should be assigned to each
level of government?  A rebalancing of state/local
spending in Kentucky away from the state
government would entail some shifting of
expenditure responsibilities to local governments.
Such a shift could take place in many ways, either by
explicit transfer of functions from state to local
governments or, more implicitly, simply by cutting
state spending and leaving it to local governments to
decide whether to increase local spending on the same
or similar functions, to expand spending in other
areas, or simply to maintain current local spending
and functions, resulting in a net shrinkage of
combined state and local spending (and taxation).
A transfer of responsibility for the maintenance of
certain roads from the state to county governments
exemplifies the first option.  The second option might
be illustrated by a cutback in state spending on
natural resources, public safety, or financial support
for local school districts.  Local governments are
already actively involved in each of these functional
areas and, if desired, could augment their spending
in each in response to cutbacks in state services.  In
the absence of state mandates, the extent of any such
adjustments would be left to the discretion of local
governments and it is likely that different localities
would respond in different ways, depending on
individual circumstances and on the nature of the
change in state government policy (Of course, all of
these possible adjustments could occur in reverse if,
initially, the state government increases its
involvement in and spending on roads, natural
resources, public safety, or elementary and secondary
education.)  From these remarks, it should be clear
that reassignments of functions between state and
local governments can certainly affect the levels of
state and local taxation, but that such reassignments
can also have many other important effects.  In
particular, changes in functional assignments
involve the expenditure side of state and local
government finance, first and foremost, while
carrying important implications for  the revenue side
as well.
Closely related to the assignment problem is the
issue of government structure.  For instance, consider
whether Kentucky should retain its “county-rich”
organizational structure.  Transportation and
communication costs have fallen dramatically since
most of Kentucky’s counties were created in the
period 1810-1830.  It is possible that many counties
could be usefully consolidated, thus, effectively,
“reassigning upward” some of the functions now
performed by counties with very small numbers of
residents to new, larger county units.  Conceivably,
consolidated county governments, perhaps equipped
with larger and more professional administrative
staffs than can now be sustained, would be better
able to manage complex tasks.  They might therefore
be better candidates for “downward reassignment”
of some functions now performed at the state
government level, allowing the state government to
streamline its operations.  This restructuring of
county governments could thus facilitate a shift in
the state’s fiscal balance away from the state
government and toward the local governments.
Of course, any such initiative would be a major
undertaking and it is being discussed here mainly in
order to illustrate the nature of the subtle and complex
consequences that can follow from changes in
government structure. A less dramatic reform that
nonetheless raises similar issues of structure,
functional assignment, and finances would be an
overhaul of the system of special districts and other
special public authorities in Kentucky.  The numbers,
functions, and financing of these special entities could
either be expanded or contracted, allowing for growth
or contraction of the local government sector as a
whole or of a reconfiguration of responsibilities and
funding among local governments. As discussed in
Section 4, their status at present is quite murky
because little information about their activities is
readily available. A thorough inventory of these units
of government and of their finances might motivate a
serious reconsideration of their role in the system of
local governance in Kentucky.
3. State Regulation of Local Taxation
As we have seen, local governments utilize a
diverse array of revenue instruments, including
property taxes, occupational license taxes, and
nontax revenues and charges.  All of these revenue
instruments must comply with the fundamental
constraints imposed by the state constitution as well
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as with statutory controls imposed by legislative
action.  This section describes the main features of
existing controls on local taxing powers.
The constitution recognizes the power of
localities to tax property, subject to limits on
maximum tax rates.  In particular, Section 157 limits
the maximum municipal tax rates to $0.75-$1.50 per
dollar of assessed valuation depending (inversely)
on city size, and to $0.50 per dollar of assessed
valuation in all counties.  In addition, under Section
181, the General Assembly may authorize localities
to impose excise taxes and “license fees” on many
“trades, occupations, and professions,” providing
the constitutional sanction for local occupational
taxes and for taxes on insurance premiums.  Section
181 is interpreted to preclude local sales taxes (LRC
(2006b, p. 12)).  It also specifically prevents the state
from collecting taxes on behalf of local governments,
which may preclude some types of “revenue
sharing” arrangements, as discussed further below.
The main statutory controls on local taxation pertain
to property taxes and occupational license taxes.  (Tax
rates on insurance premiums are not limited by
statute.)  These constraints warrant further
discussion.
HB44. Perhaps the best-known limitation on
local taxation is House Bill 44 (HB44), enacted in
1979, which limits local property tax revenues for
counties, cities, school districts, and special districts
to a rate of growth of 4% annually.2 This statute is
sometimes claimed to have had a variety of effects,
for good or ill.  Presumably, its basic goal is to restrain
local property taxation and, as we have seen,
Kentucky is indeed a state with comparatively low
levels of local property taxation.  Whether Kentucky’s
below-average utilization of property taxes is
attributable to the action of HB44 is very difficult to
determine, however.  It is true that property taxes
played a somewhat less prominent role in local
government finances after 1979.  As reported in
Boardman (2006, Table 1), county governments
derived 29.8% of their revenues from property
taxation in 1977, but only 22.3% in 1982.  This
percentage share has continued to fall over time and
now only amounts to 12.5%.  It should be noted,
however, that county governments obtained 39.2%
of their revenues from property taxes in 1972, which
is to say that property tax revenues had already
declined substantially in importance during the
period 1972-1977, two years prior to the passage of
HB44. For other units of government, as well, reliance
on property taxation has fluctuated over time.  Over
the decade 1972-1982, city governments obtained
about 20% of their revenue from property taxes, but
this share has varied in the 12-14% range since that
time.  School districts obtained about 25% of their
revenues from property taxes in 1972 and 1977.
While this percentage fell markedly in 1982, to less
than 15%, state government financial support for
schools increased substantially at the same time.
Since the early 1980s, school district dependence on
local property taxes has risen, reaching almost 23%
in 2002 – nearly equal to the 26% share of the pre-
HB44 1970s.  In short, the observed variations in
reliance on property taxation during the period 1972-
2002, by type of locality and over time, do not reveal
any clear-cut effect that is readily attributable to
HB44.
 Of course, whatever its effects on aggregate levels
of local property tax revenues, it is possible that HB44
has constrained property taxes for some specific
localities at particular points in time. Unfortunately,
direct evidence on this point is largely unavailable.
HB44 has been in operation for more than a quarter
century, during which time property valuation
administrators for every county have filed
documentation annually with state authorities
certifying HB44 compliance for every local
government within their counties.  In principle, this
documentation could have been compiled and
published annually, providing a rich body of data
on growth in property tax revenues, assessed
valuations, and tax rates for all local governments in
the state.  In practice, it appears that no such
compilation has taken place, and thus these data
have been largely unavailable for the purposes of
policy analysis and evaluation.  The Task Force
report (LRC (2006a, p. 4)) cites Wildasin (2001) (using
data on county governments for 1998-2000) and the
results of a 2005 survey of county governments by
the County Judge Executives Association, both of
which find that a minority of county governments
are limited by HB44 constraints. There are apparently
no other sources that report on the extent to which
HB44 constraints have been binding on other types
of local governments or for other periods of time.
Thus, regrettably, the proximate effects of Kentucky’s
quarter-century experiment with property tax
limitation are all but impossible to ascertain.3 This is
only one of several fundamental informational
deficiencies that hamper the analysis of local taxation
in Kentucky, as discussed in more detail below.
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Note, however, that the effects of HB44, if they
exist at all, may not necessarily take the form of
binding constraints on local government property
tax revenue.  The prospect of limited growth in
property tax revenues may have stimulated local
governments to develop and utilize various other tax
and non-tax sources of revenues that would
otherwise have not been exploited.  Furthermore, it is
possible that the state government has offered more
generous fiscal assistance to local governments
during the past quarter-century because of concerns
that local revenues would be unduly constrained by
the operation of HB44.  Finally, it is possible that
HB44 has led to a proliferation of special districts
which are not limited in the amount of property taxes
they can collect at their inception since HB44 only
constraints revenue growth relative to prior periods.
For any or all of these reasons, the number of
instances in which HB44 is strictly binding on local
revenues in a given year may be rather small even
though its impact on local government finance and
local government structure may be important.  Short
of the development of a model of the fiscal interactions
between state and local governments, there is no way
to know whether this may be the case.
In summary, the fact that constraints on growth
in property tax revenues appear not to be binding for
most counties in recent years may justify a mild
presumption that HB44 has had comparatively little
effect on local governments and that its removal
would therefore have rather modest consequences.
In this case, HB44 adds complexity to state/local
fiscal relations with little real benefit or harm.  Beyond
this, deficiencies in data and a lack of analytical effort
imply that very little is known about the effects of
HB44 on local government finances in Kentucky.  For
HB44 detractors and defenders alike, this is a highly
unsatisfactory state of affairs, providing fertile
ground for speculation but limited factual and
analytical support for the preservation, removal, or
modification of restrictions on local property taxes.
Occupational license taxes. Occupational license
tax rates are also restricted by state statute for some
units of government.  In particular, school district
occupational tax rates cannot exceed 0.5%, except
for Jefferson County (Louisville), which may impose
a rate as high as 0.75%.  County governments may
impose occupational taxes up to a rate of 1%, except
for Louisville/Jefferson County for which special
regulations apply.  Municipalities generally are not
restricted as to the tax rates they may impose.
To conclude this section, we have seen that local
governments in Kentucky are subject to a somewhat
complex set of limitations on their taxing powers.
Their power to tax property is subject to
constitutionally-imposed rate limitations as well as
to HB44 limitations on the annual growth of property
tax revenues.  Comparatively few localities appear
to be directly affected by these limitations, although
they may have had important indirect effects by
stimulating other sources of funding for local
governments.  Occupational license taxes are widely
utilized by local governments.  Cities are generally
not limited in the license rates that they may apply,
unlike counties and school districts. Local
governments may also impose taxes on insurance
premiums, at rates that are not subject to statutory
limits.  There are constitutional limitations on the
ability of localities to impose general sales taxes, as
well as on the ability of the state government to
impose taxes on behalf of local governments.4
4. The Task Force Report
The Final Report of the Task Force on Local Taxation
makes several recommendations.  Its first and most
important substantive recommendation concerns an
amendment to Section 181 of the state constitution.
As discussed above, this provision has been
interpreted to limit the ability of local governments
to impose general sales taxes and the ability of the
state government to develop a system of revenue
sharing with local governments.  The Task Force
report does not directly advocate the use of local sales
taxes nor does it provide any specific
recommendations regarding state-local revenue
sharing; its recommendation is more limited in scope,
merely proposing a constitutional amendment that
would allow for the possibility of such reforms,
should the legislature wish to consider them.  A
second focus of the Task Force report is the status of
special districts: 4 of its 11 recommendations ask for
better reporting by special districts and better
monitoring of their fiscal affairs.  Several other
recommendations urge improved coordination
between local governments and improvements in
local tax administration.  The Task Force also
proposes the establishment of a “local government
financial database” that would “provide relevant
information about local government finances to
decision makers,” and, one might imagine, also to
the public at large.   It is clear from this
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recommendation, and from those pertaining to special
districts, that the deliberations of the Task Force were
hampered by deficiencies in the existing systems for
collection and reporting of information regarding
local government finances.  Let us consider the main
Task Force recommendations and some of the policy
issues that they raise.
Local Sales Taxation. The charge to the Task
Force indicated that it should explore the possibility
of local sales taxation as one method for “generating
a comparable amount of local revenue,” that is, as a
potential replacement for local revenues now
obtained from other sources. In a similar vein, the
Task Force, in its recommendations, recognizes that
if the General Assembly were to allow localities to
impose sales taxes, it could also attempt to constrain
the use of other local taxes so as to keep total local
revenues at current levels.  In practice, the
introduction of the sales tax as a new revenue
instrument for local governments could well result
in increases in revenues for some localities, perhaps
accompanied by decreases for others.  The report does
not discuss whether sales taxes would be used by
counties, cities, school districts, special districts, or
by some combination of all of these. If experience in
other states can be used as a guide, a local sales tax
would likely be utilized mainly by localities in the
largest metropolitan areas in the state, as smaller
governments would struggle with the administrative
complexities associated with its implementation.
Given the economic importance of the state’s largest
metropolitan areas, the introduction of such a tax
could have a perceptible impact on aggregate local
revenues which could, however, be offset by limiting
other revenue sources.
If the local sales tax is viewed as a potential
substitute for existing taxes, would it be used to reduce
local property, income, or insurance premium taxes?
The sales tax might be used to supplement or
substitute for the insurance premium tax; both are
levied on the revenues or sales of businesses, and
thus share some administrative similarities, but of
course the sales tax would be much broader in its
application.  On the other hand, because of its
breadth and because taxes on earnings are (very)
broadly similar in their economic effects to taxes on
consumption, a local sales tax might be viewed as a
substitute for local occupational license taxes.
Localities differ, of course, in the extent to which their
residents earn income or make purchases within their
own boundaries.  A locality with many residents that
commute to places of employment in other
jurisdictions may collect relatively little revenue from
a tax on earnings, whereas major employment centers
can derive significant revenues from the earnings of
non-resident workers; similarly, jurisdictions with
major shopping centers might use a local sales tax to
obtain revenues generated by sales to non-residents
as well as residents. For these reasons, a switch from
local occupational to local sales taxes could have
important differential revenue impacts across
localities. As a third possibility, the introduction of
local sales taxes could be accompanied by further
restrictions on property taxation.  The local sales tax
differs quite substantially, both in administrative
terms and in terms of its economic effects, from local
property taxes.
The overall policy advantages or disadvantages
of any of the above tax substitutions are not
immediately apparent and cannot be ascertained
without further analysis.5  Presumably such analysis
would underpin any future deliberations by the
General Assembly, should Section 181 be amended
to permit local sales taxes.
Revenue Sharing. The charge to the Task Force
also specified that it should consider the desirability
of revenue sharing for local governments, and the
Task Force indeed recommends that Section 181 be
amended in order to allow such policies.  The form,
magnitude, and purpose of such revenue sharing is
little discussed in the Task Force report, however.
The report expresses some concern that a revenue
sharing system might result in reductions in local
tax effort, stating that “any revenue sharing programs
implemented should require a specified level of local
effort before a local government is permitted to
participate. … The concept is that local governments
should help themselves before seeking assistance
from Frankfort.”
In principle, revenue sharing systems can be
devised to serve a variety of different policy objectives.
For instance, they can be used to overcome
administrative hurdles to the use of certain taxes by
lower-level governments.  As an illustration, suppose
that it were considered desirable to make the local
occupational tax on individuals more like the state
income tax by broadening its base to include nonwage
income while simultaneously preserving exemptions,
deductions, credits, and other special features
commonly found in personal income taxes.  Local
governments might find it cumbersome to implement
Kentucky Annual Economic Report 2007 1 9○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Local Government Finance in Kentucky:Time for Reform?
such a tax, and it would impose nontrivial
compliance costs on taxpayers.  As an alternative,
the state could share which each locality a portion of
the income tax revenue that it derives from the
taxpayers located there.
On the other hand, revenue sharing systems can
be designed to advance quite different goals.  For
instance, HB44 or rate limits on local occupational
taxes may constrain local revenues to an undesirable
degree, perhaps leading local authorities to  “seek
assistance from Frankfort” in order to meet urgent
expenditure needs.  A system of state-local fiscal
transfers could be devised that would put additional
resources at the disposal of local authorities, based
on some measure of fiscal need (e.g., inversely related
to per capita income or assessed property valuation)
or in accordance with some other criteria.
Designing a revenue sharing system that
achieves its intended objectives is no simple matter,
however.  The Task Force recognizes that fiscal
transfers to local governments may result in
reductions in local taxes rather than increased
funding for local services, effectively substituting state
funding for local own-source revenues.  The Task
Force suggests that such transfers can be conditioned
on local fiscal effort, for instance by requiring
localities to utilize their local property taxes up to
some specified levels.  It is also possible to devise
revenue sharing formulae that provide additional
funding for localities that display high levels of tax
effort.  In practice, however, it is difficult to prevent
the erosion of local own-source revenues, and the
attempt to do so can easily give rise to very complex
monitoring and enforcement requirements.  For
example, suppose that localities maintain their
property tax collections in order to comply with
revenue-sharing regulations while simultaneously
reducing their use of charges, fees, and other nontax
revenue sources.  In this case, the net effect of revenue
sharing transfers from the state to recipient localities
would be to replace local nontax revenues by state
government revenues.   As is evident from Table 1,
local governments in Kentucky derive more revenue
from such nontax sources than they do from property
taxation, so there is ample scope for localities to
reduce their overall revenue-raising efforts while
maintaining or even increasing property tax
revenues.  In an attempt to maintain overall fiscal
effort, therefore, the state might be led to monitor and
regulate local use of nontax revenues in addition to
property or other major taxes. The ensuing
magnification of state control over the details of local
finance and policies would likely entail a substantial
loss of local fiscal and policy autonomy, substantial
administrative complexity and cost, and reduced
overall responsiveness of local fiscal policies to the
demands of local residents.
The prospect of such a policy evolution
highlights the importance of achieving the utmost
clarity in the formulation of fundamental policy
objectives and of using the simplest and most direct
methods to achieve them. For instance, if localities
are perceived to have insufficient revenues at their
disposal, it is crucial to determine why this should
be the case.  Local revenue inadequacy might result
from the operation of state government limitations
on local taxing powers such as HB44, in which case
deregulation of local taxes may be a more transparent
and effective policy option than the creation of a
revenue sharing system, with its associated new
body of regulatory constraints.  On the other hand,
revenue insufficiency may be important mainly for a
subset of localities, distinguished by type (county,
municipal), by levels of income or development, or
by size.  Clear identification of underlying policy
concerns is critically important for the design and
implementation of effective reforms.
As the foregoing remarks indicate, revenue
sharing systems can be developed for many different
policy purposes – to allow recipient governments to
utilize new revenue sources with minimum
administrative complexity, to transfer resources to
lower-level governments with high fiscal “needs,”
to shift the overall burden of financing state and local
government away from the latter and toward the
former, or for any number of other reasons.  The
optimal design of a revenue sharing system depends
crucially on the policy objectives it is intended to
achieve.  If Section 181 is amended to allow the
introduction of some form of revenue sharing, the
important task of defining the purposes of such a
program and the examination of alternative means
to those ends still lies ahead.
Special Districts and Compilation of Local Fiscal
Data.  As attested by the reliance of the Task Force
and other analysts on US Census data, and as already
indicated by some of the preceding discussion, the
state of Kentucky has not as yet developed an
adequate system for the compilation and reporting
of data on local government finances.  The situation
regarding special districts, public authorities, and
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other special governmental entities is particularly
problematic. Theoretically, every unit of government
in the state is supposed to file an annual uniform
financial information report (UFIR), but testimony
before the Task Force indicated that compliance with
this requirement is poor.  At present, it appears that
there is no reliable and comprehensive compilation
that identifies these governmental units and that can
be used to analyze their revenues, expenditures,
borrowing, or other financial and fiscal data.  Under
these circumstances, the Task Force was unable to
examine in any systematic way the role of these
governmental entities in Kentucky’s fiscal system.
This situation can be remedied relatively easily
and at modest cost, as the Task Force has
recommended.  Until this is done, policy analysis
and evaluation is undermined and the state is
exposed to potentially significant financial risks.  To
gauge the kinds of risks that may be involved,
consider the findings of a study by Bridges (2005),
which   attempts to gather data on borrowing by
public authorities in several metropolitan areas in
Kentucky.  This study examines six large jurisdictions
(Jefferson and Fayette counties, Bowling Green,
Florence, Owensboro, and Paducah) and finds that
special public authorities within some of these
jurisdictions account for 80% or more of total local
indebtedness. Information about this borrowing is
not readily available to the public, and thus the
residents of localities in the Commonwealth may be
exposed to significant liabilities associated with the
activities of public authorities of which they are
unaware.
More generally, as noted already in connection
with HB44, there is a dearth of information regarding
local fiscal policies in Kentucky.  It is often argued
that local governments, being “closer to the people,”
can be monitored and controlled relatively easily by
their residents, creating a presumption that they are
more responsive to local demands than higher-level
governments.  This basic perspective, articulated in
a classic paper by Tiebout (1956) and developed in
an extensive literature for the past half century, is
based partly on the presumed public availability of
information about local policies.  In the absence of
such information, local governments may be
“captured” by interest groups or may simply fail to
perform in accordance with the demands of local
residents.6
The absence of adequate data regarding local
finances undoubtedly limited the scope of Task Force
activities.  The establishment of a special Task Force
to examine local finances is an unusual event, and it
is a pity that the Commonwealth has missed an
exceptional opportunity for a more thorough
investigation of important policy issues due to the
poor quality of local financial and fiscal data.  Future
policy deliberations can be significantly enhanced
by the development of modern financial reporting
systems for all local governments within the state,
including regular and transparent publication of
fiscal data for public use.
5. Conclusion
The Task Force on Local Taxation has touched
upon several important issues and has left others for
future discussion and analysis.  Its recommendations
for constitutional amendments highlight the
desirability of enhanced flexibility for the General
Assembly to introduce new financing options for
local governments.   The Task Force report does not,
however, examine the potential desirability of
enhanced flexibility for local taxation within the
existing constitutional boundaries.  In particular, it
recognizes the potential importance of HB44
restrictions on local property taxation but does not
seriously consider the potential advantages, in the
form of increased local revenue autonomy, that might
flow from the relaxation or removal of these
restrictions.  The Task Force report also has little to
say about statutory limitations on local occupational
tax rates.  There may be sound reasons for states to
impose limits on local taxes, although the competitive
pressures under which localities operate also
constrain local taxation even in the absence of
statutory restraints.  But, in any event, a review and
reconsideration of the specific types local tax
limitations in Kentucky is in order.  For instance, after
more than 25 years of HB44 property tax limitations,
is there any basis for a presumption that a limit of 4%
annual growth in property tax revenues serves public
interests better than a limit of 3%, 5% or no limit at
all? Is there a persuasive justification for limits on
occupational tax rates for counties and school
districts but not for municipalities?  On what basis
can the present limits on occupational tax rates be
justified?  In the absence of careful review and
analysis, predicated on the availability of underlying
Kentucky Annual Economic Report 2007 2 1○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Local Government Finance in Kentucky:Time for Reform?
fiscal data, the present system appears to be
somewhat haphazard in design and it effects, largely
unknown.
The Task Force identifies serious limitations in
the availability of basic information concerning local
government finances and recommends that these
deficiencies be remedied.  Especially given the current
state of data management technologies, the cost of
these remedies is modest and the benefits – to
policymakers, to analysts, and, above all, to the
general public – are great.  If these recommendations
are implemented, researchers and analysts, both
within the public sector as well as outside, will be
able to shed significant new light on local fiscal
policies and their impacts.  This information would
be of great value in future deliberations regarding
the possible introduction of local sales taxation,
revenue sharing, or other policy options. In addition,
better data on local finances can assist in the
monitoring and control of borrowing and financial
management by special districts and public
authorities, thus reducing financial risks for the
Commonwealth’s fiscal system as a whole and
perhaps reaping some benefits in the form of reduced
borrowing costs as well.
The development of local government finances
in Kentucky is still a work in progress.  Major policy
issues regarding government structure, the
assignment of functional responsibilities among
levels of government, and the proper sphere of local
revenue autonomy await further analysis. If the
recommendations of the Task Force are followed,
these issues will soon command the attention of
policymakers and the public. Immediate
improvements in data and support for significant
analytical work can help to provide a foundation for
more informed evaluation of the policy options that
are likely to arise.
Endnotes
1. Several studies and reports may be consulted by
readers seeking more detailed information about
local government finance in Kentucky.  Hoyt (2001)
and Boardmand (2006) have contributed important
treatments of this subject in previous issues of the
Kentucky Annual Economic Report.  In connection with
the work of the Task Force on Local Taxation, the
Legislative Research Commission (LRC) (n.d., 2006a)
has prepared very informative surveys and reviews
of local taxation, including much more detail than
is provided below concerning the laws regulating
local government finance.  Wildasin (2001) also
reviews local government finance issues in
Kentucky.  All of these studies also contain
references to additional sources of information on
this subject.
2.  For the sake of simplification, this discussion omits
some of the technical details of HB44 and other
regulations governing local taxation.  For more
discussion, see, e.g., Wildasin (2001) and LRC (n.d.,
2006a).  It should be explicitly noted that the voters
in any locality always have the prerogative, through
special referenda, to approve revenue growth in
excess of the 4% limit.
3.  Assuming that annual PVA documentation has been
preserved, it would likely be possible, at
comparatively modest cost, to compile these data
and thus to provide a meaningful foundation for
the evaluation of HB44’s impact.
4.  It should be noted, however, that the recent state tax
reform transferred the responsibility for the
collection of taxes on telecommunications services
from localities to the state government, with the
revenues to be distributed to the localities in
accordance with their previous levels of collections.
Although this arrangement presumably conforms
with Section 181 of the constitution, it could be
characterized as a system of state collection of
revenues on behalf of local governments.
5. In weighing the attractiveness of possible tax
substitution reforms, it is important  to consider
interactions between the Federal and state tax
systems.  Local occupational and property taxes are
generally deductible for purposes of Federal
personal income taxation, reducing the net burden
of these taxes, while the deductibility of sales taxes
has varied substantially over time.  In the absence
of deductibility, sales taxation is less appealing.
6.   Other local revenue instruments, such as tax increment
financing or selective local economic development
incentives, should also be transparently reported
so that citizens can monitor their use and so that
their impacts may be assessed.
References
Boardman, B. (2006), “The Composition of Kentucky’s
Local Government Revenue,” 2006 Kentucky Annual
Economic Report, 9-16.
Bridges, D. (2005), “Public Authorities and Determinants
of Aggregate Debt:  Kentucky’s Municipal
Governments.” Unpublished.
Hoyt, W. H. (2001), “Differences in Tax Bases and Tax
Effort Across Kentucky Counties,” 2001 Kentucky
Annual Economic Report, 23-36.
Legislative Research Commission (n.d.), “Issues
Confronting the Task Force on Local Taxation,”
prepared for initial meeting of Task Force on Local
Taxation.
Legislative Research Commission (2006a), Final Report of
the Task Force on Local Taxation: House Bill 272. Research
Memorandum No. 500.
Center for Business and Economic Research2 2 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Local Government Finance in Kentucky:Time for Reform?
Legislative Research Commission (2006b), Issues
Confronting the 2007 General Assembly: An Update of
Informational Bulletin No. 218 (2006).  Informational
Bulletin No. 221.
Martie, C.W. (2001), “Tax Equity in Kentucky,” in D.E.
Wildasin, M.T. Childress, M. Hackbart, L.K. Lynch,
and C. W. Martie, Financing State and Local
Government: Future Challenges and Opportunities
(Frankfort: Long Term Policy Research Center), 39-
56.
Tiebout, C. M. (1956), “A Pure Theory of Local Public
Expenditures,” Journal of Political Economy, 64, 416-
424.
Wildasin, D. E. (2001), “Local Government Finances in
Kentucky,” in D.E. Wildasin, M.T. Childress, M.
Hackbart, L.K. Lynch, and C. W. Martie, Financing
State and Local Government: Future Challenges and
Opportunities (Frankfort: Long Term Policy Research
Center), 73-102.
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Kentucky Annual Economic Report 2007 2 3○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
Differences in State and Local Government
Spending between Kentucky and its Neighbors:
How Much and Why?
William Hoyt
Introduction
Concerns about and calls for eliminating
government waste are frequent topics of political
rhetoric at all levels of government and throughout
the country. While politicians may frequently
disagree about the merits of many federal, state, or
local programs, they seem united in ensuring that
tax dollars are not “wasted”. Indeed, efforts at
“eliminating” government waste and inefficiency
have been found in administrations headed by both
Republicans and Democrats.
While the media has, on occasion, brought
examples of gross or fraudulent waste to public
attention, both in Kentucky and elsewhere, there have
been few studies, by the media or scholars, that have
attempted to examine these concerns in a more
systematic and thorough way.
In the language of economists, waste is generally
referred to as inefficiency. However, the definition of
inefficiency for an economist often differs from how
a layman might define inefficient, with the
economists’ definition generally being much broader.
Economists generally think of three aspects of
efficiency: productive, allocative, and technical. For an
economy to be efficient it must be efficient in all these
aspects. Productive efficiency refers to producing the
“right” amount of goods and services, that is,
balancing the desires of consumers with the costs of
production in determining how much is produced.
Allocative efficiency refers to ensuring that the goods
and services produced by the economy are, in fact,
allocated among people in an appropriate way with
those who benefit the most, in terms of their
willingness to pay for a good, receiving it. Finally,
technical efficiency refers, in its simplest terms, to
produce goods and services in a cost minimizing
way.
It is probably this notion of technical efficiency
that coincides most closely with the layman’s notion
of efficiency and the concerns about the lack of
efficiency in government – the costs of producing
government goods and services are simply too high.
To be sure, while we frequently hear about concerns
about unnecessary government “Pork Barrel” projects
such as “Bridges to Nowhere” that would be
considered examples of productive efficiency, probably
most public concerns still focus on the notion that
production of government services require the use of
too many resources, particularly labor, relative to
what might be expect for the same or similar services
in the private sector.
While this notion of waste is easy to understand
and provide example of, efforts at providing more
than anecdotal evidence have proven to be more
difficult. The difficulties in determining whether a
government is producing services efficiently or which
governments are comparatively more efficient
primarily arise for two reasons. First, it is difficult to
measure the “output” of most government services.
For some government goods and service, there are at
least some crude measures, for example, cost per lane
mile for highways or cost per inmate day for
corrections. For others, such as administrative or
police services, for example, it is very difficult to
Politicians, citizen watchdogs groups, the media, and voters all frequently express concerns
about state and local government spending, particularly if they feel tax dollars are being wasted.
While the measurement of government “waste” is beyond the scope of this study, I offer some
comparisons of government spending by function between Kentucky and its neighboring states.
I find that our spending, on a per capita basis, is generally within the range of our neighbors. In
addition, I also examine how spending on a per capita basis varies with some of the characteristics
of the states. I find that per capita state and local government spending in Kentucky is higher
than the average of these states because of its smaller population, more centralized spending, and
large number of local governments. However, its lower average wages and demographics act to
reduce its predicted spending.
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conceive of any measure other than per capita cost.
Of course, using these crude measures ignore the issue
of the quality of services – are per capita
administrative costs higher in one state than another
because of greater inefficiency or higher quality,
perhaps in the form of faster response time to
concerns, reduced waiting times, etc.
In addition to difficulties associated with
quantifying output, there are additional difficulties
in trying to understand and identify differences in
the cost of producing government goods and services
among states or localities. Even if we are comfortable
measuring the output of a state highway department
as the number of lane miles constructed or
maintained, it is unrealistic to think that maintenance
costs are the same in a flat state (Illinois) and a
mountainous state (West Virginia) or possibly the
same for a state subject to lengthy winters and frost
(Indiana) and a state with a more moderate climate
(Tennessee). Even more extreme may be the
relationship between inputs or expenditures in
primary and secondary education.
Given these difficulties in measuring the output
and cost of producing government services, our goal
here is much more modest than attempting to
determine whether Kentucky is producing its
services relatively more or less efficiently than its
neighbors. Instead, we have two objectives:  First,
document some of the differences in spending among
Kentucky and its neighboring states. While
differences in spending are not, in themselves,
evidence of inefficiency, substantial differences
between the costs in Kentucky and its neighbors
might suggest the need for a closer examination of
the provision of this good or service.
Second, we use statistical (regression) analysis
to attempt to determine what factors seem to influence
state and local (per capita) spending in Kentucky
and its neighboring states for the years of 1992, 1997,
and 2002. We focus our analysis on the
determination of total state and local spending and
administrative spending. An earlier study, Hoyt et.
al. (2005), considers the determinants of spending
for a number of additional government functions.
Broadly we can think of the determinants of the
expenditures on government services as falling into
three categories: demographic and economic
characteristics of the state, the structure of the state
and local governments within a state; and a set of
unidentified factors influencing costs. The first set of
determinants includes the population and the
composition of the population such as race, age, and
education level and characteristics of its economy
such as median income and unemployment rate.
These factors are likely to affect both the cost of
providing the services as well as the demand for these
services. At least in the short term, these factors might
be considered beyond the control of the state. The
second set includes characteristics of the state’s
government structure including the local share of
expenditures, the number of local governments, and
the sources of revenue for the state. These are factors
that are at least conceivably in the control of the state
or local governments in a state. Of particular interest
is at what level of government are the expenditures
made and the revenues collected within a state.
Finally, there is a “state-specific fixed effect,” the
unexplained, time-consistent difference in spending
in a state from the average of the states. It is tempting
to consider this unexplained component of costs as
Table 1: Population and Population Composition of Kentucky and its Neighbors, 2000
Household with Households
State Population Urban African-American Hispanic  Children under 18 over 65
# (2003) Rank % Rank % Rank % Rank % Rank % Rank
Kentucky 4,117,827 7 55.8 8 7.3 8 1.5 8 33.0 5 31.6 7
United States 290,809,777 79.2 2 12.3 4 13.7 1 33.5 2 33.1 4
Illinois 12,653,544 1 87.8 1 15.1 3 12.3 2 33.6 1 32.6 5
Indiana 6,195,643 4 70.8 5 8.4 7 3.5 4 33.4 3 32.2 6
Missouri 5,704,484 6 69.4 6 11.2 6 2.1 6 32.4 6 34.4 2
Ohio 11,435,798 2 77.4 3 11.5 5 1.9 7 32.2 8 33.9 3
Tennessee 5,841,748 5 63.6 7 16.4 2 2.2 5 32.2 7 31.5 8
Virginia 7,386,330 3 73.0 4 19.6 1 4.7 3 33.2 4 29.3 9
West Virginia 1,810,354 8 46.1 9 3.2 9 0.7 9 29.3 9 37.5 1
Source: Census of Population & Housing, 2000
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a measure of the relatively efficiency of a state in
producing its good or services. While this
unexplained difference could well be due to relative
inefficiency or efficiency, we resist the temptation to
label it such. As with significant differences in the
actual per capita costs, significant differences in the
unexplained component in costs might indicate the
need for further examination of efficacy in the
provision of the service.
A Comparison of the Socio-Demographic
and Economic Characteristics of Kentucky
and its Neighbors
As discussed, part of our objective is to relate the
costs of government goods and services to the socio-
demographic and economic characteristics of a state
as we believe these may be important factors in
determining the costs of producing these services.
Table 1 provides data from the 2000 Census of
Population on Kentucky and its neighbors. As the
table shows Kentucky has a smaller population than
all of its neighbors and a lower percentage of African-
Americans and Hispanics with the exception of West
Virginia. It ranks in the middle with respect to
households with children under 18 and near the
bottom with respect to the number of households with
a head over the age of 65.
As shown in Table 2, Kentucky’s mean income,
mean earnings, and percentage of adult population
ages 18–65 employed are above only that of West
Virginia and its poverty rate is only above West
Virginia’s. Finally, Table 3 shows the relative
education of the adult (over the age of 25) population
of the states in 2000. Again, only West Virginia has a
lower level of education.
Patterns in Aggregate State and
Local Spending
Figure 1 gives a pattern of total state and local
direct spending as a fraction of income for Kentucky,
Table 3: Educational Attainment of Residents of Kentucky and its Neighbors, 2000
Less than High School Some Some College College
High School Graduate College or Associate or More
% Rank % Rank % Rank % Rank % Rank
Kentucky 25.9 1 33.6 4 18.5 8 23.4 8 17.1 8
United States 19.7 4 28.6 7 20.9 3 27.2 2 24.4 3
Illinois 18.4 7 27.8 8 21.6 2 27.7 1 26.1 2
Indiana 17.8 8 37.2 2 19.7 7 25.5 6 19.4 7
Missouri 18.6 5 32.8 5 21.9 1 27 3 21.6 4
Ohio 17 9 36.1 3 19.8 6 25.7 5 21.1 5
Tennessee 24.1 3 31.6 6 20 5 24.7 7 19.6 6
Virginia 18.5 6 26 9 20.4 4 26 4 29.5 1
West Virginia 24.8 2 39.5 1 16.6 9 20.9 9 14.8 9
Source: Census of Population & Housing, 2000
2000$ Rank % Rank 2,000$ Rank % Rank
Kentucky 33,672 7 15.8 2 20,951 7 44.5 8
United States . 12.9 . 45.8
Illinois 46,590 2 10.7 6 25,890 1 47 5
Indiana 41,567 3 9.5 9 23,229 4 48.8 1
Missouri 37,934 5 11.7 5 21,751 5 47.5 4
Ohio 40,956 4 10.6 7 23,949 3 47.6 3
Tennessee 36,360 6 13.5 3 21,700 6 46.6 6
Virginia 46,677 1 9.6 8 25,357 2 48.2 2
West Virginia 29,696 8 17.9 1 19,159 8 40.5 9
Median Household Income below
Income poverty level Median Earnings Employed
Table 2: Income and Employment Measures for Kentucky and its Neighbors, 2000
Source: Census of Population & Housing, 2000
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Figure 2:State & Local Government Direct Spending, Per Capita
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Figure 1:State & Local Government Direct Spending, Share of Income
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Governments Division. Annual Survey of Government Finances.
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West Virginia, and the average of Kentucky’s
neighbors from 1979 to 2002. West Virginia is
included because its spending was so much greater
than the other states. Note that while Kentucky’s
spending, as a fraction of income, is somewhat
greater than the average of its neighbors, it essentially
follows the same pattern. Note that a very different
relationship between Kentucky and its neighboring
states spending is found in Figure 2 when state and
local spending is measured on a per capita basis
rather than as a fraction of income. In this case,
Kentucky is spending somewhat less than its
neighbors and Indiana and Ohio, not West Virginia
and Kentucky, are the high spending states. That the
lower income states, West Virginia and Kentucky,
have higher spending as a fraction of income but
generally lower on a per capita basis suggests that
spending increases appreciably with income.
Figure 3, depicting the state and local government
employment as a percentage of total employment
within a state, gives a different perspective on the
extent of state and local services in the economies of
the states. Here Kentucky follows a pattern very
similar to that of its neighbors and the U.S. with West
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Figure 3:State and Local Employment, Percentage of Total, 1979-2004
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, REIS
Table 4: State and Local Government Employment per 1,000 Residents, Selected Years
   Annual
Employment per 1,000 Rank  % Change
1992 1997 2002 1992 1997 2002
Kentucky 52.47 53.14 56.25 3 4 2 0.70
United States 51.68 53.60 54.29 4 3 4 0.49
Illinois 47.51 50.35 51.08 9 8 9 0.73
Indiana 52.48 52.75 52.81 2 5 7 0.06
Missouri 47.64 54.10 55.12 8 1 3 1.47
Ohio 48.29 50.24 53.37 7 9 5 1.01
Tennessee 49.68 52.01 52.91 6 6 6 0.63
Virginia 54.60 53.81 56.40 1 2 1 0.33
West Virginia 50.31 50.70 51.61 5 7 8 0.26
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, REIS
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Virginia again being a very significant outlier. In
contrast, Table 4 shows that West Virginia has a very
low rate of employment per capita with Virginia and
Kentucky having the highest per capita state and local
employment. That West Virginia has the highest rate
of state and local government employment as a
fraction of its total workforce but lowest on a per
capita basis can easily be explained by the lowest
rate of employment among adults ages 18 to 65 there.
Finally, Table 5 reports on the average earnings
(per month) for all state and local employees adjusted
for inflation and indexed by average private earnings
in the state. The effect of indexing by average private
earnings is to deflate the earnings in those states in
which private earnings are higher and to inflate them
in states with lower private earnings. This is done to
reflect the belief that in a competitive labor market,
salaries and wages of public employees should reflect
the earnings of workers in the same occupations in
the private sector. Of course, if states have very
different mix of private and public employment,
indexing is not giving an accurate indication of the
prevailing private sector earnings in a similar
occupation. Having offered this proviso, comparing
indexed earnings to nominal earnings across states
is still probably a better indication of the relative wage
costs in the public sector. As Table 5 shows, indexed
wages are highest in West Virginia and those in
Virginia are the lowest with Kentucky’s in the
middle. In fact, nominal average monthly earnings
in Virginia in 2002 were $450 more per month than
they were in West Virginia; however, private earnings
per month were 23% more in Virginia a significantly
greater gap than found in earnings in the public
sector.
Differences in State and Local
Spending by Government Function
As we examine more rigorously in the next section,
some of the differences among states in government
spending appear to be related to the mix of spending
Table 5: Salaries, Average for All State and Local Government Employees,
 Indexed and Adjusted for Inflation
Annual
Monthly Salary,  $2002 Rank   % Change
1992 1997 2002 1992 1997 2002
Kentucky 2853 3122 2648 3 4 6 -0.74
United States 2943 3203 2780 2 2 3 -0.57
Illinois 2824 3194 2677 5 3 5 -0.53
Indiana 2849 3069 2746 4 6 4 -0.37
Missouri 2701 2918 2527 9 9 8 -0.66
Ohio 2960 3287 2889 1 1 2 -0.24
Tennessee 2722 2937 2614 7 8 7 -0.4
Virginia 2707 3009 2504 8 7 9 -0.78
West Virginia 2740 3075 2926 6 5 1 0.66
Table 6: Share of State in State and Local Government Expenditures, 2002, By Function
Primary Parks
and and  Financial Judicial
Higher Secondary Public High- Correc- Recre- Adminis- and Legal
Education Education Welfare Health ways tion ation tration Services
Kentucky 100 67 99 51 81 65 47 74 82
United States 84 85 53 61 68 16 55 46
Illinois 68 37 96 81 45 72 7 47 28
Indiana 100 55 89 73 64 74 11 51 30
Missouri 80 39 97 71 59 76 9 55 50
Ohio 92 49 80 30 54 77 11 54 17
Tennessee 100 48 98 75 64 58 26 38 47
Virginia 97 44 79 47 82 69 13 58 46
West Virginia 99 68 100 71 94 85 53 75 68
Based on: U.S. Bureau of Census, Census of Governments and Autho’rs adjustments
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Census of Governments
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between the state and local governments. In Table 6
we list the share of the state government in state and
local spending by function for 2002. Kentucky is, in
most functions, much more
centralized than most of its neighbors
with West Virginia again being the
exception. The tendency towards
centralization in Kentucky is most
apparent in primary and secondary
education, highways, and parks and
recreation.
Table 7 provides a summary of
state and local expenditures for 2002
for a number of government
functions. These are measured on a
per capita basis with exceptions
being education services, measured on a student
basis, and corrections measured on an inmate basis.
As with total state and local spending, for most
government functions Kentucky generally ranks in
Direct Expenditures Current Expenditures Central Administration Financial Administration Corrections
Per % Per % Per % Per % Per %
capita Rank Change capita Rank Change capita Rank Change capita Rank Change  Inmate Rank Change
Kentucky 6,073 6 3.3 4,398 8 3.0 69 4 7.2 60 6 2.1 27,233 6 2
United States 7,110 1 2.8 5,210 1 2.7 63 5 2.2 66 3 3.0  .  .  .
Illinois 6,944 3 3.5 4,810 4 3.6 90 1 4.5 64 5 3.4 30,133 3 2
Indiana 5,896 8 3.5 4,689 5 3.0 85 2 2.5 45 7 0.7 29,014 4 0
Missouri 5,826 9 3.8 4,328 9 3.6 56 6 4.5 43 8 3.5 20,706 7 2
Ohio 7,009 2 4.1 4,934 3 3.4 51 7 4.0 131 2 8.2 28,904 5 2
Tennessee 6,328 5 1.8 5,077 2 2.9 43 9 3.6 27 9 0.6 19,402 8 -6
Virginia 5,994 7 2.3 4,547 7 2.7 51 8 2.3 65 4 2.6 31,557 2 2
West Virginia 6,609 4 3.5 4,642 6 3.2 80 3 6.6 137 1 7.8 38,374 1 3
Primary and Secondary Higher Education, State
Education Appropriation  Health Hospital Highways
Per % Per % Per % Per % Per %
Student Rank Change Student Rank Change capita Rank Change capita Rank Change capita Rank Change
Kentucky 7,536 7 2.22 6966 2 8.88 178 5 7.3 175 8 -1.0 477 1 2.6
United States 6262 4 1.48 206 3 3.2 304 4 0.1 402 5 1.7
Illinois 8,967 1 2.12 7984 1 4.70 238 2 6.3 176 7 0.5 451 2 1.2
Indiana 8,268 4 2.43 4761 9 -3.09 110 9 2.3 357 2 -0.1 330 7 1.9
Missouri 7,699 6 2.20 6605 3 0.57 124 8 0.9 305 3 4.6 436 3 3.2
Ohio 8,928 2 2.03 5535 6 1.75 270 1 4.9 208 6 -0.1 359 6 1.1
Tennessee 6,489 8 3.20 5241 7 -0.60 179 4 4.5 391 1 0.8 306 8 -1.1
Virginia 7,928 5 2.40 5810 5 3.69 156 6 0.9 281 5 1.8 426 4 1.7
West Virginia 8,451 3 2.64 4824 8 5.66 128 7 1.5 158 9 -1.3 576 1 3.9
Judicial Services Natural Resources Parks and Recreation Police Public Welfare
Per % Per % Per % Per % Per %
capita Rank Change capita Rank Change capita Rank Change capita Rank Change capita Rank Change
Kentucky 77 5 3.6 74 3 -1.1 63 8 0.9 133 8 2.5 1,164 2 3.5
United States 109 2 2.7 76 2 1.4 105 2 2.7 224 2 2.5 835 6 2.7
Illinois 88 4 2.8 51 5 5.0 201 1 4.0 256 1 2.9 749 8 1.3
Indiana 62 9 3.3 58 4 3.6 77 5 6.5 145 7 4.0 780 7 3.9
Missouri 66 8 2.3 49 6 -1.2 76 7 1.6 180 5 3.1 948 4 4.2
Ohio 119 1 4.5 37 8 1.9 91 3 4.4 212 3 3.0 852 5 2.7
Tennessee 73 6 3.0 43 7 -0.2 76 6 1.4 169 6 3.3 1,091 3 5.2
Virginia 90 3 4.2 30 9 -2.8 87 4 3.0 180 4 1.8 497 9 3.0
West Virginia 69 7 4.7 99 1 2.3 63 9 3.4 104 9 4.5 1,183 1 4.2
Table 7: State & Local Government Expenditures, 2002
Table 8 Highway Expenditures, Per Mile Traffic Flow
$2002 for 1999
Road Miles Lane Miles
State Local State Combined Local State Combined
Kentucky 7 55 24 4 25 12
Missouri 11 42 19 5 19 9
Indiana 9 121 23 5 48 11
Tennessee 10 90 23 5 36 11
West Virginia 24 27 26 12 13 13
Illinois 20 117 32 10 45 15
Ohio 21 102 36 10 41 17
Virginia 44 41 41 20 19 19
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Census of Governments
Source: Federal Highway Administration
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the middle to low range on per capita spending.
Exceptions are public welfare and highways and
higher education (per student). Of course, while
public welfare is state-administered, spending and
revenues are in large part federally funded and, of
course, means tested, reducing much of the discretion
of the state. A significant share of highway funding
also comes from federal funds as well. Table 8
provides an alternative measure of highway costs,
cost per mile of traffic flow. By this measure,
Kentucky’s highway costs are relatively low, perhaps
an indication of a great deal of out-of-state traffic on
Kentucky roads.
Kentucky’s high level of state appropriations per
student for higher education probably reflects a
relatively small share of funds for its public colleges
and universities coming from tuition or private funds
as shown in Table 9.
Based on the rather simplistic measure of costs
per capita, barring any dramatic differences in either
the quality and extent of services or the costs of
producing services between Kentucky
and its neighboring states, there
appears to be little evidence that
Kentucky is producing these services
in either an unreasonably costly way
or extraordinarily cost-effective
manner. In the next section, we
examine the determinants of
government service costs more
rigorously.
Determinants of
Differences among States
in the Costs of
        Government Services
While the preceding section documents
differences in the costs of government services among
Kentucky and its neighbors, it offers no explanation
as to why these differences might arise. Here, using
findings of Hoyt et. al. (2005), we discuss some of the
determinants of these differences in spending. As
discussed in the Introduction, we consider two broad
categories of characteristics of the state: socio-
economic factors, presumably outside the control of
governments, and characteristics of its government
structure.  Socio-economic factors include the
population, poverty rate, median income,
unemployment rate, the ratio of employment to
population, the fraction of the population that is
African-American, the fraction Hispanic, the fraction
Native American, the fraction of the population
living in an urban area, and median age.
Characteristics of the state government structure
include average county population, average
Table 9: Average Tuition in Public Higher
 Education Institutions,
Selected Years ($2002)
Annual %
1997 Rank 2000 Rank 2002 Rank Change
Kentucky 2595 6 3329 4 3291 7 4.9
Illinois 1608 8 1926 8 2217 8 6.6
Indiana 3725 3 4294 1 4848 2 5.4
Missouri 4322 1 3095 6 3332 6 -5.1
Ohio 3755 2 4199 2 5090 1 6.3
Tennessee 2412 7 3154 5 3887 3 10.0
Virginia 3533 4 3548 3 3597 4 0.4
West Virginia 2893 5 2990 7 3392 5 3.2
Table 10: Sources of Differences among States in
     State and Local Government Expenditures
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j)
# of Difference
Difference Expend- Local Source Income- between
from Pop- iture Govern- of Relative Employ- Demo- Explained
Mean lation Share ments Revenue Earnings ment graphics Explained & Actual
Kentucky -221 707 399 77 -55 -450 -33 43 688 -849
Illinois 466 -1,435 -253 28 92 764 -49 -75 -928 991
Indiana -389 251 -79 40 -17 -157 132 137 307 -744
Missouri -562 396 -12 111 95 -111 84 76 639 -1,117
Ohio 504 -1,161 82 -16 -125 37 60 118 -1005 1,078
Tennessee 189 362 -307 11 283 -219 -15 38 153 71
Virginia -161 -75 27 -333 -120 387 -75 13 -176 -30
West Virginia 174 1,663 542 160 -208 -701 -139 -306 1011 599
Source: The NCHEMS Information Center (www.higheredinfo.org)
Source: Hoyt et.al. (2005)
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municipal population, and the average number of
students per school district. These factors are
intended to reflect the existence of economies or
diseconomies of scale in local governments. Also
included were measures of the state share of
expenditures, the fraction of state and local revenue
coming from the federal government, and the fraction
of local revenue coming from the state government to
determine if either the level of the source or spending
influenced the level of spending. Also included was
our measure of public earnings relative to private
earnings in the state. Finally, the composition of the
upper and lower house (% Democrat) and the
affiliation of the Governor are included as
characteristics of the government.
While Hoyt et. al. (2005) examines the
determination of spending for a number of
government functions; here we only discuss their
findings for total state and local spending and for
state and local administrative spending. Based on
the estimation in Hoyt and Garen (2004), Figure 4
characterizes the estimated relationship between total
state and local spending per capita and state
population for a regression in which only the only
factor considered was population (line A) and a
regression which controlled for the other factors
discussed in the preceding paragraph (line B).  Based
on population alone, the predicted difference in per
capita spending between the state with the largest
population (Illinois, 12,653,544) and smallest (West
Virginia, 1,810,354) is $675 per capita, with West
Virginia having the greater spending. In contrast
when controlling for other factors likely to influence
total state and local spending, spending in West
Virginia is predicted to exceed spending in Illinois
by over $2,100 per capita. In fact, in 2002 state and
local spending in West Virginia was over $300 less
per capita than in Illinois.
If, as according to our regression results,
increases in the population of the state reduce per
capita spending other factors must explain the
relatively low per capita spending in the Kentucky,
Missouri, and West Virginia. Column (a) of Table 10
reports the difference in total state and local
government spending per capita between each state
and the mean of the eight states. Columns (b) – (h)
decompose the predicted difference in spending
among the states based on our estimation results.
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Figure 4: Economies of Scale for Total State and Local Expenditures
Source: Hoyt and Garen (2004)
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Each of these columns represents expenses predicted
to be above or below those of the average due to that
factor. For example, because expenditures are
predicted to be lower as population increases and
Kentucky’s population is below the average of the
states, its per capita spending is predicted to be $707
more per capita (column (b)). Because more
centralized spending (more by the state) is found to
increase total spending and Kentucky has a greater
share of its spending done by the state government,
its per capita spending is expected to be $399 more
(column (c)). The large number of local governments
in Kentucky or, more precisely, small population per
governmental unit, results in a slight increase in per
capita expenditures ($77) as does its demographics
($43). Centralized revenue collection, lower public
earnings, and lower income and average earnings
are all predicted to reduce spending relative to
average of the states.  Column (i) provides the totals
of columns (b) – (h). For Kentucky, this total is $688,
meaning that based on its characteristics and our
estimate of the relationship between the
characteristics of these eight states and per capita
spending, Kentucky’s per capita spending should
be $688 more than the average. In fact, as reported in
column (a), Kentucky’s spending is $221 below the
average. Then the difference between these two
numbers, $849, is the unexplained difference for
Kentucky. If we believed we had fully captured the
determinants of both the demand and costs functions
for government services, we might reasonably assert
that this difference reflects “waste”, that is,
unexplained differences in costs. However, lacking
the confidence to make such an assertion, we might
make the safer assertion that Kentucky’s total
expenditures do not seem excessive given the
composition of its population, its economy, and the
structure of its government.
As another example of this type of exercise in
explaining the determinants of government costs,
Table 11 provides a decomposition of the
determinants of state and local per capita
administrative costs based on an analogous
regression. Again, Kentucky’s actual costs are below
the mean (-$60) with qualitatively similar impacts of
the alternative factors on predicted costs. However,
in this case, explained costs are $36 greater than the
mean of the states meaning that Kentucky’s per capita
administrative costs are $96 than expected given its
characteristics.
Conclusion
While undoubtedly important, answering the
questions whether or how efficiently government
services are provided is likely to prove difficult for a
number of reasons. Perhaps the greatest single
detriment to the determining the efficacy of public
service provision is the absence of a market for these
services which would offer a “market-test” of whether
they were efficiently provided. In the absence of a
viable market for government services, we rely on
less direct methods of ascertaining the existence and
extend of inefficiency in their production and
provision. However, attempts to compare the costs
of public services across state and localities is
impaired by difficulties in measuring output or
controlling for differences in the quality of public
services. Accounting for inefficiency is further
Table 11: Sources of Differences among States in Administrative Expenditures
# of Difference
Deviation Expend- Local Source Income- between
from Pop- iture Govern- of Relative Employ- Demo- Explained
Mean lation Share ments Revenue Earnings ment graphics Explained & Actual
Kentucky -60 142 16 10 -19 -3 3 -113 36 96
Illinois 22 -146 -9 5 16 6 -16 188 44 22
Indiana 2 25 -3 6 13 -1 9 -38 11 10
Missouri -78 40 0 16 -21 -1 19 -32 21 99
Ohio 100 -120 3 0 11 0 4 -19 -120 -220
Tennessee -92 36 -10 -5 -18 -2 14 5 20 112
Virginia 2 -9 1 -36 28 3 -16 84 55 53
West Virginia 45 175 18 14 -29 -5 -15 -189 -32 -76
Mean 308
Source: Hoyt et.al. (2005)
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plagued by the fact that characteristics of the state,
particularly its population, may affect the costs of
providing services to its residents.
With these caveats in mind, here we compare the
expenditures on, not the efficiency in provision of,
state and local government services between
Kentucky and its surrounding neighbors.  In terms
of total state and local expenditures and for most
government functions, on a per capita basis generally
Kentucky spends below the average. While higher
education appropriations and highway spending
are notable exceptions, the higher education
appropriations appear to offset lower tuition and
while highway spending is high on a per capita basis
it is relatively low when adjusting for traffic volume.
In addition to documenting differences in spending
between Kentucky and its neighbors, we also estimate
a relationship between government expenditures and
characteristics of the state that are likely to influence
government expenditures including socio-
demographic and government structure ones. Our
results suggest that per capita government
expenditures are negatively related to state
population and positively related to the number of
local governments in a state, suggesting economies
of scale in the provision of government services. As
Kentucky has a smaller population than all but one
of its neighbors and far more governments per capita,
these factors tend to increase expenditures in
Kentucky. Lower public earnings and demographics
act to reduce expenditures on government services
in Kentucky.
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The Minimum Wage and Kentucky’s
Working Poor:
Low Hours or Low Wages?
Kenneth R. Troske and Aaron Yelowitz
Many policymakers in Kentucky have suggested raising the state’s minimum wage as a way
to help poor families. In this report, we examine which Kentucky workers would be helped
and hurt by a $7 minimum wage in Kentucky. The results indicate that both the poor families,
which the minimum wage increase is intended to help, and the state as a whole would be, if
anything, less well off if the wage was raised. We investigate the earned income tax credit as
an alternate method of assisting poor families and find it to be less disruptive and more likely
to assist the targeted recipients.
Introduction
It has now been almost 10 years since the last
increase in the federal minimum wage. After
adjusting for inflation, the minimum wage is at its
lowest level in over 50 years. That has led 18 states
and the District of Columbia to increase their
minimum wages. In the November 2006 election,
voters in six additional states raised the minimum
wage. A natural question is whether Kentucky should
follow suit. To answer this question we examine the
effects of raising the minimum wage for workers in
Kentucky to $7 an hour, or $1.85 an hour more than
the current federal minimum wage.
Most supporters of increasing the minimum
wage argue that it would help workers in poor
families (the “working poor”) by providing them with
a “livable wage.” They also argue that it is the socially
fair thing to do. Unfortunately, as anyone who has
closely studied the minimum wage knows, increases
in the minimum wage have a very small impact on
poverty. In addition, the impacts of the minimum
wage are far from fair by any measure—the minimum
wage tends to provide a small amount of help to the
most-skilled low-wage workers while imposing a
severe hardship on the least-skilled low-wage
workers. Finally, by lowering the demand for less-
skilled labor among employers, increasing the
minimum wage actually exacerbates the primary
problem faced by workers in poor families—they are
poor because they are out of the workforce for more
than four months out of the year, not because they
earn exceptionally low wages.
The goal of this report is to use a large
representative data set, the March 2005 Current
Population Survey (CPS), to document which
Kentucky workers are helped and hurt by the
proposed increase in the minimum wage. Along the
way we will present estimates of how many
Kentucky workers would lose their jobs if the
minimum wage were raised from $5.15 to $7 an hour.
Finally, we will suggest some alternative policies that
are much better targeted towards the working poor
because they address the root causes of poverty.
These alternative policies could potentially have a
much larger impact on poor working families in
Kentucky.
A Description of the Current
Population Survey
The primary dataset used in our analysis is the
2005 March CPS Annual Social and Economic Survey
(U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, 2005). We begin our report with a brief
description of these data.
The CPS is a credible and widely respected
survey. The March 2005 CPS surveys nearly 77,000
households and asks questions that specifically
address issues of employment and wages. It is
administered by the Bureau of the Census for the
Bureau of Labor Statistics and has been conducted
for more than 50 years.1 The response rate for the
March survey is exceptionally high for a voluntary,
household-based survey.2 The sample is scientifically
selected to represent the civilian non-institutional
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population. The Census Bureau states that the CPS
sample provides estimates for the nation as a whole
and contributes to model-based estimates for
individual states and other geographic areas. The
CPS is conducted by telephone and in-person (and
thus includes residences without telephones).
The March 2005 CPS surveyed 210,648 people
across the nation (76,447 households), and 3,033
people in Kentucky (1,138 households). When
appropriately weighted, the estimated population
count from the CPS is 291,156,238 for the United States
and 4,074,129 for Kentucky. The count for Kentucky
exactly matches published Census tabulations, while
the count for the United States appears to be subject
to a trivial amount of rounding error.3 Unless
otherwise noted, all estimates in the paper are based
on the weighted data.
The 2005 March CPS also identifies a number of
localities in Kentucky, including Bowling Green,
Lexington, Louisville, and northern Kentucky. These
localities, when weighted, represent more than 40
percent of Kentucky’s population, with Louisville
and northern Kentucky alone representing 30
percent. Identification of these localities is important,
because a significant portion of Kentucky’s
population lives in “border cities” where businesses
can move across state lines (to Indiana, in the case of
Louisville, and Ohio, in the case of northern
Kentucky) in response to an increase in the cost of
doing business in Kentucky. In such cases where
businesses could move yet remain in the same labor
market, one might expect that some jobs would be
shifted from Kentucky to other states if employers
were suddenly forced to pay higher wages to some
workers in Kentucky. In our analysis of the labor
market, we make adjustments for such border cities.
Employment information in the CPS is elicited
for all household members age 16 and over. The
survey asks all adults questions about usual hours
worked per week, annual earnings, weeks worked
per year, employer’s industry and firm size.
Typically, a single CPS respondent reports for
everyone in the household, although telephone call-
backs to obtain particular items of information known
only by someone else in the household are fairly
common.4
The CPS provides demographic information for
all respondents on age, education, race, ethnicity,
gender, marital status, and disability. It also provides
sufficient information to identify family relationships
across household members. This information is
critical for classifying low-wage workers.
Characteristics of Low Wage Workers
We will use the CPS data to produce a picture of
what type of workers earn wages below the proposed
$7 minimum wage and what type of workers are from
poor families. If workers earning wages below the
proposed minimum wage look like workers from poor
families, then we would conclude that changes in
the minimum wage could help workers from poor
families. However, if the two populations look very
different, then it is more difficult to imagine how
changes in the minimum wage could help workers
in poor families.
Table 1 presents, successively, summary statistics
for non-elderly adults (those aged 16 to 64), adult
workers, low-wage workers, and workers in poor
families. We define low-wage workers as those
workers who are earning less than $7 an hour
according to the CPS, since these are the workers that
will be most affected by the change in the minimum
wage.5 We classify workers as being in poor families
using the poverty line defined by the U.S. government.
In the U.S. the poverty threshold is fixed (in real
dollars) over time but varies by the number of
individuals living in the household. In 2004 a four-
person household consisting of two adults and two
related children was considered poor if total
household income was less than $19,157.
Looking at Table 1 we see that 2.01 million of
Kentucky’s 2.69 million non-elderly adults, or 75
percent, worked during 2004, with the average
worker’s age being 38.5 years. Among all workers,
family income averaged more than $65,000 and just
10 percent lived in poverty (all dollar amounts are
expressed in 2006 dollars). The average wage among
all workers was nearly $18.32 per hour. In addition,
the average worker received approximately $1.03 per
hour in employer contributions to health insurance
plans.
Approximately 19 percent of all workers are low-
wage workers earning less than $7 per hour. These
workers are clearly different from higher-wage
workers, yet they are also different from workers who
live in poverty. Low-wage workers are much younger,
on average. The average age of low-wage workers is
32.1, making the typical low-wage worker more than
six years younger than the typical adult worker.
Among low wage workers 52 percent are teenagers
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All non-elderly All workers Workers Under All Poor
adults $7 Per Hour Workers
Weighted Sample in Kentucky 2,696,043 2,012,061 380,929 201,300
Individual Demographics
Age in years 39.1 38.5 32.1 32.2
Aged 16 to 19 7.9% 5.3% 16.8% 10.1%
Aged 20 to 29 22.7% 24.9% 36.3% 41.0%
Aged 30 to 39 19.1% 21.0% 18.5% 23.7%
Aged 40 to 49 22.7% 25.3% 14.5% 12.8%
Aged 50 to 59 21.0% 18.8% 11.1% 11.1%
Aged 60 to 64 6.7% 4.6% 2.9% 1.4%
Married 53.7% 56.7% 33.8% 29.9%
Male 49.5% 51.1% 42.0% 43.3%
No High School Diploma/GED 21.3% 13.4% 32.0% 27.8%
Enrolled in School 9.9% 7.0% 23.2% 11.8%
White 90.7% 90.9% 90.6% 88.9%
African-American 7.2% 7.1% 7.8% 6.7%
Individual Work Behavior
Worked in 2004 74.6% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Uninsured 19.0% 18.4% 37.0% 50.5%
Employer Health Insurance In Own Name 43.6% 54.1% 20.3% 19.8%
Adult has disability 13.2% 3.6% 5.8% 3.5%
Annual hours worked 1831.3 1441.2 1219.6
Usual Work Hours Per Week 39.3 35.9 36.0
Weeks Worked in 2004 45.5 39.2 33.0
Wage Rate $18.32 $5.63 $7.14
Wage Gap to $7.00 $0.26 $1.37 $1.03
Health Insurance Hourly Rate $1.03 $0.22 $0.72
Under $7.00 Per Hour 19% 100% 69%
Annual Cost of Raising Wage $368.72 $1,947.60 $1,390.49
Family Characteristics
Family Total Income $58,601.86 $65,107.69 $34,355.79 $8,619.94
Number of Family Members 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.5
Number of Children Under 18 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.0
Under 100% of Poverty 16.5% 10.0% 36.2% 100.0%
Over 400% of Poverty 36.1% 41.9% 15.3% 0.0%
How Worker Fits Into Household
One worker (single or married) with kids 11.7% 12.5% 29.2%
Worker lives with parent or relative 15.5% 28.0% 12.1%
Two workers in married couple with or without kids 45.8% 25.6% 16.8%
One worker (single or married) without kids 20.7% 21.9% 24.4%
Non-relative 6.3% 12.0% 17.6%
TABLE 1
Summary Statistics of Kentucky Adults, 2004
(Author’s tabulation of 2005 March CPS)
Notes: Authors’ tabulation of 2005 March CPS, covering the 2004 calendar year. All dollar amounts are expressed constant 2006
dollars. Wage rate is computed by dividing annual earnings by the product of usual hours worked per week and weeks worked;
non-negative values of the wage rate that were below $5.15 were then imputed as $5.15 an hour. The CPS asks only individuals
aged 16 to 24 whether they are enrolled in school; the analysis assumes no adults age 25 and over are enrolled in school.
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or in their twenties, compared with 30 percent of all
workers. They are also far more likely to be single
and enrolled in school: only 33 percent of low wage
workers are married compared to 56 percent of all
workers, while nearly one-quarter of low wage
workers are still in school compared with only 7
percent of adult workers.
Although the average wage rate among low-
wage workers is only $5.63 per hour, these workers
tend to live in households that are far from poor. The
average family income of low-wage workers exceeds
$34,000. As Figure 1 shows, slightly more than one-
third of workers live in families with incomes below
100 percent of the poverty line, and just as many live
in families with incomes at least 200 percent of the
poverty line. Perhaps most relevant, however, is how
the worker fits into the household. As we can see in
Figure 2, only 12 percent of low wage workers are
sole-earners supporting children. The most common
living arrangement for a low-wage worker is with
his or her parents (or other relatives), which is the
living arrangement of 28 percent of low-wage
workers. More than 25 percent are spouses in two-
earner families, and 33 percent are either childless
workers or non-relatives in the household (e.g.,
roommates). Thus, the notion that raising the
minimum wage primarily benefits poor working
families is mistaken. (See, for example Economic
Policy Institute’s web site, http://www.epinet.org/
content.cfm/issueguides_minwage_minwagefacts).
These figures should dispel the notion that poverty
and low wages are synonymous.
The notion is further dispelled by looking at
workers in poor families. Returning to
the final column of Table 1, here we see
that 64 percent of workers in poor
families are between 20 and 39 years old
compared with only 54 percent of low
wage workers. In addition, only 11.5
percent of workers in poor families are
in school, a number that is almost double
that of all adult workers but well below
the number for low-wage workers.
However, the most striking difference
between low-wage workers and workers
in poor families concerns their wages.
The average wage among workers in
poor families is $7.19 per hour – higher
than a $7 per hour minimum wage. More
than one-third of workers in poor
families have wages above the proposed minimum
wage. The key difference between poor workers and
the typical adult worker is in hours of work —workers
are poor because, on average, they work 1,236 hours
per year compared with 1,831 hours per year for all
adult workers. As we will show in Table 4, the poverty
rate could be dramatically lowered if less skilled
adults worked full-time throughout the year. Finally,
when we look at how workers in poor households fit
into the family we see that 29 percent of workers in
poor families are sole workers in families with
children, in contrast to the 12 percent of low-wage
workers.
Clearly there are some significant differences
between the typical low-wage worker who would be
affected by an increase in the minimum wage and
the typical worker in a poor household. Minimum
wage workers tend to be young, are likely to be
enrolled in school and live with a parent or relative
who still works. Research by Carrington and Fallick
(2001) also finds that minimum wage workers
typically earn the minimum wage for a relatively
short period of time. All of this suggests that the
majority of minimum wage workers are young
workers in the early part of their careers who earn
the minimum wage for only a short period. In
contrast, the typical worker in a poor household is
older, earns a wage above $7.00 an hour and is the
sole worker in a family with children. The primary
reason workers tend to be poor is not due to low
wages, but is due to working fewer hours than the
typical adult worker. Given these differences between
low wage workers who would be affected by the
Under 100%
37%
100% to 200%
27%
200% to 300%
13%
300% to 400%
9%
Over 400%
14%
Figure 1
Poverty Status of Low Wage Workers
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proposed change in the minimum wage and poor
workers, it seems highly unlikely that an increase in
Kentucky’s minimum wage would have much
impact on poor workers.
Effect of Kentucky’s Proposed
Increase in the Minimum Wage
We now use the CPS data to estimate what effect
the proposed minimum wage increase would have
on the Kentucky labor market and on workers. One
of the fundamental principles of economics is that if
the price of a good increases the demand for that
good will fall. Another way of stating this principle
is that demand curves slope downwards. This
principle has been well documented and shown to
be true for goods as varied as apples, gasoline and
(most important for our purposes) labor. This means
that if the price or wage for labor is increased then
the demand for labor will fall. The only question is:
by how much will demand fall?
Economists use a concept called elasticity to
measure how responsive the demand for a good is to
changes in the price of the good. The elasticity
indicates how much the demand for a good will
decline when the price of the good increases by 1
percent. For example, if the elasticity of a good is -0.5
this means that a 10 percent increase in the price of a
good will lead to a 5 percent decrease in the demand
for the good. In a report published by the Show-Me
Institute David Neumark (2006) has reviewed the
economics literature estimating how responsive labor
demand is to changes in the minimum wage.
According to Neumark the best estimates of the
elasticity fall in the range of -0.1 to -0.3, meaning that
a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage will lead
to a fall in labor demand of 1 percent to 3 percent.
David Neumark and William Washer (2000) estimate
an elasticity of -0.22.6 When estimating the impact of
the proposed increase in the minimum wage on the
Kentucky labor market we will assume elasticities of
-0.1, -0.22, and -0.3. However, there are reasons to
believe that the impact of the proposed minimum
wage increase would be larger in some parts of
Kentucky than in others because the two major labor
markets in Kentucky — Louisville and northern
Kentucky — are both located on the borders of the
state. This means that it would be relatively easy over
the long run for business in these two areas to relocate
to Indiana or Ohio, where the minimum wage has
not changed, in reaction to the increase in the
minimum wage in Kentucky. Therefore, we will also
produce an estimate of the impact of the proposed
increase in the minimum wage assuming an elasticity
of -0.3 for workers in Louisville and northern
Kentucky and assuming an elasticity of -0.22 for
workers in the rest of Kentucky.
Table 2 contains our estimates of job loss from
Kentucky’s proposed new minimum wage. Using the
March CPS, we estimate that there are 380,929
workers with hourly wage rates under $7.00. The
first row in Table 2 presents our best estimate of the
job losses that would occur in Kentucky with the
proposed increase in the minimum wage. In this line
we apply an elasticity estimate of -0.3 to workers in
the two “border areas,” Louisville
and northern Kentucky, and an
elasticity of -0.22 to workers in the
rest of Kentucky. When we do so, we
find that the minimum wage
increase would result in a loss of
more than 24,298 jobs, representing
6.3 percent of low-wage
employment. The other lines in Table
2 present estimates of the job loss
assuming elasticities of -0.1, -0.22
and -0.3, respectively.
Table 3 profiles job losers and job
keepers, based on our estimates from
line 1 in Table 2. To create this
profile, we examine the 380,929 low
wage workers, separating them out
into the 24,298 who would lose their
Single earner with 
kids
12%
Living with a 
parent or relative
28%
Dual earner
26%
One earner, no 
kids
22%
Non-relative in 
household
12%
Figure 2
Household Structure of Low Earners
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jobs based on our calculations and the 356,631 who
would keep them.7 The most remarkable finding is
that both groups look extremely similar in terms of
demographics. Both those who keep their jobs and
those who lose their jobs tend to be young (over 16
percent of both groups are under 20 years old) and
still in school. In addition, neither group is
particularly poor: the typical worker in each group
lives in a household with around $32,000 in family
income. In both groups more than ten percent of
workers live in families with incomes that are over
four times the poverty line. All of this provides further
evidence that the minimum wage effects are not well
targeted at the poor. The 356,631 workers who receive
a pay raise (and keep their jobs) add $685 million in
labor costs, while those who lose their jobs reduce
labor expenditures by $183 million. In total, the labor
costs of Kentucky businesses would likely increase
by more than $500 million due to the minimum wage
proposal.
One additional important fact to note is that the
proposed increase in the minimum wage would result
in relatively small gains in income experienced by
some workers and in very large losses felt by other
workers. On a per-worker basis, those who keep their
jobs would see their incomes rise by $1,921 — an
increase of 5.5 percent in their family incomes, while
those who lose their jobs would see their incomes
fall by $7,536 — a decrease of 24 percent in their
family incomes. While it is impossible to assess
whether the increase in income among those who
keep their jobs is worth more than the loss in income
suffered by those who lose their jobs, what is clear is
that the rather small gain in income experienced by
some workers would be paid for by a severe loss in
income suffered by other workers.
Impact of the Minimum Wage, Work
Hours and the EITC on the Poverty
Rate
In the final part of our analysis we estimate the
impact the $7 minimum wage would have on the
poverty rate. Table 4 simulates poverty reductions
from raising the minimum wage, and also considers
how the poverty rate would change if, instead of
raising the minimum wage, all low-wage workers
and workers in poor families worked full-time (2,080
hours in a year, the product of 40 hours per week of
work and 52 weeks per year). Finally, the table
simulates the effects of a state-level earned income
tax credit (“EITC”) that matched the federal EITC.
The table presents poverty estimates for the 4.07
million individuals in all families, the 948 thousand
individuals in families with a low wage worker, and
the 754 thousand individuals in poor families.
Among all individuals in Kentucky, the poverty rate
was 18.5% in 2004. Among individuals in families
with a low-wage worker, the poverty rate was 28.3%,
and by definition, the poverty rate was 100% for
individuals in poor families. The reason why the
poverty rate in Table 4 differs for low wage workers
is because this table includes other family members
besides the low wage worker (e.g., non-workers,
children, elderly, etc.).
Among individuals in families with low-wage
workers — the only individuals for whom a higher
minimum wage could reduce poverty — poverty rates
would fall by 9 percent if the minimum wage was
raised to $7 per hour, after accounting for hours
reductions due to the higher wage floor. Although
this reduction is certainly significant, it pales in
comparison to the results of policies that would
Elasticity Job Loss Low Wage Workers % of Low Wage Workers
-0.22 except Louisville & Cincinnati 24,298 380,929 6.4%
-0.22 21,556 380,929 5.7%
-0.10 9,792 380,929 2.6%
-0.30 29,392 380,929 7.7%
TABLE 2
Estimates of job loss by raising minimum wage to $7 per hour
(Authors’ calculations using 2005 March CPS)
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Job Losers Job Keepers
Weighted Sample in Kentucky 24,298 356,631
Individual Demographics
Age in years 31.2 32.2
Aged 16 to 19 16.1% 16.8%
Aged 20 to 29 41.7% 35.9%
Aged 30 to 39 17.7% 18.5%
Aged 40 to 49 12.1% 14.7%
Aged 50 to 59 9.0% 11.2%
Aged 60 to 64 3.4% 2.8%
Married 31.6% 33.9%
Male 42.5% 42.0%
No High School Diploma/GED 29.2% 32.2%
Enrolled in School 22.6% 23.2%
White 88.7% 90.7%
African-American 9.3% 7.7%
Individual Work Behavior
Worked in 2004 100.0% 100.0%
Uninsured 37.4% 36.9%
Employer Health Insurance In Own Name 19.6% 20.3%
Adult has disability 6.2% 5.8%
Annual hours worked 1412.7 1443.2
Usual Work Hours Per Week 36.0 35.9
Weeks Worked in 2004 38.7 39.2
Wage Rate $5.34 $5.65
Wage Gap to $7.00 $1.66 $1.35
Health Insurance Hourly Rate $0.24 $0.22
Under $7.00 Per Hour 100.0% 100.0%
Annual Cost of Raising Wage $2,331.98 $1,921.41
Family Characteristics
Family Total Income $31,465.85 $34,552.69
Number of Family Members 2.6 2.7
Number of Children Under 18 0.7 0.7
Under 100% of Poverty 40.3% 35.9%
Over 400% of Poverty 12.8% 15.5%
How Worker Fits Into Household
One worker (single or married) with kids 12.0% 12.5%
Worker lives with parent or relative 28.0% 28.1%
Two workers in married couple with or without kids 23.6% 25.7%
One worker (single or married) without kids 23.7% 21.8%
Non-relative 12.8% 12.0%
Increase In Wage Bill For Job Keepers $685,233,656
Decrease In Wage Bill For Job Losers -$183,130,894
Total Increase In Wage Bill $502,102,762
Notes: Authors’ tabulation of 2005 March CPS, covering the 2004 calendar year. All dollar amounts are expressed constant
2006 dollars. Wage rate is computed by dividing annual earnings by the product of usual hours worked per week and weeks
worked; non-negative values of the wage rate that were below $5.15 were then imputed as $5.15 an hour. The CPS asks only
individuals aged 16 to 24 whether they are enrolled in school; the analysis assumes no adults age 25 and over are enrolled in
school.
TABLE 3
Job Losers and Job Keepers Under $7 Per Hour Minimum Wage
(Authors’ tabulation of 2005 March CPS)
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encourage workers to work full-time. The poverty rate
among this group falls by 29 percent by simply
bringing low-wage workers and non-working adults
up to full-time, full-year work, at their existing wages.
Lastly, we observe that a state-level EITC that matched
the federal EITC reduces poverty among this group
by a smaller amount than the minimum wage.
Next, we turn to the 754 thousand poor
individuals in Kentucky. As we have shown in Table
1, poor workers live in quite different circumstances
than low-wage workers, and different policies are
socially desirable if the ultimate goal is to alleviate
poverty. Raising the minimum wage would remove
approximately 24 thousand individuals from
poverty. Increasing work effort among adults would
remove 78 thousand individuals from poverty and
raising the EITC would remove nearly 50 thousand
from poverty.
The first column shows the overall effect on
poverty in Kentucky. Raising hours of work reduces
poverty rates by nearly two percentage points.8 In
this case we observe that raising the minimum wage
would have a trivial effect on overall poverty. For
example, the poverty rate would fall by 0.6 percentage
points after we account for the resulting loss in jobs.
The numbers in Table 4 again demonstrate that the
problem of poverty stems from a lack of work hours
much more than from low wages. What is particularly
insidious about increasing the minimum wage is that
it provides employers with an incentive to decrease
the hours of low wage workers—which has exactly
the opposite effect that we need to decrease poverty
among poor workers. Instead we should consider
adopting or expanding programs that are designed
to encourage poor workers to enter the labor market
or to work more hours.
The best way to increase the hours worked by
workers in poor families depends on the reasons why
workers are not working full-time. Three possible
reasons why workers in poor families work so few
hours are: that poor workers do not have enough
incentive to work or to work more hours; that poor
workers lack the necessary skills to obtain full-time
jobs; or that poor workers have situations—such as
taking care of children or transportation issues—that
make it very costly for them to work at full-time jobs.
However, we already have a number of government
programs designed to help workers with these
problems. First, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
is a program that gives poor workers a tax credit if
they work but have low earnings. The EITC has
historically provided very modest tax credits for
childless households and more substantial credits
to households with children (while differentiating
between households with one child and those with
more than one child).
The major advantage that the EITC has over the
minimum wage is that instead of providing a wage
subsidy for relatively wealthy teenagers, the EITC is
directly targeted at workers in poor households.
Initially, the EITC is phased-in with a “credit rate,”
which is, in essence, a wage subsidy. From 1994
onward, this subsidy has been equal to 34 percent
for one-child households and 40 percent for two-plus
child households. In 2006, the maximum subsidy was
$2,747 for a household with one child and income
between $8,080 and $14,810, and $4,536 for a
household with two or more children and income
between $11,340 and $14,810. A full-time worker in
these circumstances who earned the minimum wage
could be entitled to a tax credit as high as $4,285.9
After household income exceeds $14,810, the credit
is gradually phased out. Households with incomes
exceeding $36,348 would not be eligible for the EITC
in 2006.10
The EITC moves many workers out of poverty.11
The EITC provides a strong incentive for poor
individuals who are currently not working to begin
Individuals in Individuals
families with low in poor
All individuals  wage worker  families
Baseline Poverty Rate 18.50% 28.27% 100.00%
Raise Minimum Wage to $7 with hours reduction 17.90% 25.72% 96.79%
Full time, full-year work for non-elderly adults 16.58% 20.04% 89.64%
State level EITC equal to federal EITC for adults
not enrolled in school 17.28% 26.69% 93.44%
Population 4,074,129 947,953 753,608
TABLE 4
Impact of Policies on Poverty Rates
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working, and it provides incentives for poor workers
who are doing some work to increase the amount
that they work. In fact, many researchers have
attributed much of the dramatic decline in the number
of families on welfare in recent years to the increases
in the EITC in the 1990s (Blank, 2002).
Fourteen states and the District of Columbia
supplement the federal EITC with a state-level EITC.
These states include two of Kentucky’s neighbors—
Illinois, and Indiana.  Other states with a state EITC
include Iowa, Kansas Michigan, Oklahoma and
Wisconsin. In most of these states, the state-level EITC
is simply a fixed percentage of the federal EITC. The
percentage varies by state and exceeds 30 percent
some cases. For example, in Kansas, the state-level
EITC provides a credit equal to 15 percent of the
federal EITC. Thus, a household in Kansas could
receive a cumulative tax credit as high as $5,216.12
Almost all workers would escape poverty if they
worked full time and received a state-level EITC at
this level. For example, a single parent working full-
time, with two children, would need a wage rate of
$5.48 per hour to escape poverty if the federal and
state EITC refunds were counted in poverty
calculations.13 A much more effective policy for
reducing poverty than increasing the minimum wage
would be for Kentucky to follow the lead of
neighboring states and, instead of raising the
minimum wage, adopt a state-level EITC.
As part of welfare reform in the 1990s, the federal
government increased the availability of child care
subsidies and increased spending on job training
programs designed to increase the skills of poor
workers. These programs have the distinct advantage
that they are much better targeted towards the poor
than increases in the minimum wage, and they
therefore have a much larger impact on poverty than
any proposed minimum wage increase.
Conclusion
The advocates of raising the minimum wage are
driven by the best of intentions. Poor families in
Kentucky face many challenges, and it’s appropriate
to consider ways to help them. In crafting anti-poverty
programs, it’s important to consider the costs of the
programs. A law that imposes a large cost on the
economy while achieving only small reductions in
poverty is bad public policy.
Unfortunately, most of the benefits of a minimum
wage hike would go to people who don’t need them.
The vast majority of workers who would enjoy higher
wages under the proposal do not live in poor
households. Almost a quarter of low-wage workers
are students, and more than 28 percent of low-wage
workers live with their parents. Only 12 percent of
low-wage workers are single parents. On the other
side of the ledger, the costs of the minimum wage
hike would be large. We estimate that 24,000 workers
would lose their jobs. And businesses would face
$500 million in increased labor costs.
A far more cost-effective strategy for combating
poverty is to expand the Earned Income Tax Credit, a
program whose benefits are narrowly targeted at
those who need help the most. We estimate that an
expansion of the EITC would be more than twice as
effective at reducing poverty as an increase in the
minimum wage. And it would help poor workers
without destroying jobs or imposing hundreds of
millions of dollars of higher labor costs on Kentucky
employers.
References
Blank, Rebecca. 2002. “Evaluating Welfare Reform in the
U.S.” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol 40, No. 4,
December, p. 1105-1166.
Carrington, William J. and Bruce Fallick. 2001.
“Minimum Wage Careers?” Monthly Labor Review,
May, p. 17-27.
Heckman, James J. 1979. “Sample Selection Bias as a
Specification Error.” Econometrica, Vol. 47, No. 1,
January, p. 153162.
MacPherson, David. 2006. “The Effects of the Proposed
Missouri Minimum Wage Increase.” Mimeo,
Employment Policies Institute, http://
w w w . e p i o n l i n e . o r g / s t u d i e s /
macpherson_082006.pdf .
Neumark, David. “The Economic Effects of Minimum
Wages: What Might Missouri Expect from Passage
of Proposition B?” Show-Me Institute, 2006.
Neumark, David, and William Wascher. 2000.
“Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study
of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and
Pennsylvania: Comment.” American Economic Review,
Vol. 90, No. 5, December, pp. 1362-96.
U.S. House of Representatives. 2004. Overview of
Entitlement Programs: Background Materials and Data
on Programs Within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on
Ways and Means (“The Green Book”), Government
Printing Office, Washington DC, http://
www.gpoaccess.gov/wmprints/green/2004.html.
Yelowitz, Aaron. 2005a. “Santa Fe’s Living Wage and
the Labor Market.” Mimeo, Employment Policies
Institute, http://www.epionline.org/studies/
yelowitz_092005.pdf.
Center for Business and Economic Research4 4 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
The Minimum Wage and Kentucky’s Working Poor: Low Hours or Low Wages?
Yelowitz, Aaron. 2005b. “How Did the $8.50 Citywide
Minimum Wage Affect the Santa Fe Labor Market?
A Comprehensive Examination.” Mimeo,
Employment Policies Institute, http://
www.epionline.org/studies/yelowitz_122005.pdf .
The Stata data and programs used in the analysis are
available at: http://gatton.uky.edu/faculty/
yelowitz/kentucky.htm
Endnotes
1. See http://www.bls.census.gov/cps/overmain.htm.
2. The CPS has a large percentage of in-person interviews
that improves coverage and reliability and leads to
a very high response rate. Interviewers use laptop
computers to administer the interview, asking
questions as they appear on the screen and directly
entering the responses obtained. Households are
interviewed eight times over the course of sixteen
months. During the first and the fifth interviews, an
interviewer usually visits the sample unit. Almost
all of the remaining interviews are conducted by
telephone. Even though the CPS is a voluntary
survey, the March interview of recent years has
between 92 and 93 percent of the eligible households
providing basic labor force information, and
between 80 and 82 percent of the eligible households
completing the ADS supplement. For the March 2002
basic CPS, the nonresponse rate was 8.3 percent. The
nonresponse rate for the March supplement was an
additional 8.6 percent, for a total supplement
nonresponse rate of 16.2 percent. See http://
www.bls.census.gov/cps/ads/1995/sdacodes.htm,
http://www.bls.census.gov/cps/ads/1995/
smethovr.htm, and http://www.bls.census.gov/
cps/ads/2002/S&A_02.pdf for additional discussion.
3. See http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/032005/health/
h05_000.htm.
4. See http://www.bls.census.gov/cps/ads/1995/
sdacodes.htm.
5. Wage rates are computed by dividing an individual’s
annual earnings by annual hours of work (the
product of weeks worked and usual hours worked
per week). Since the CPS data reflect the 2004
calendar year, the wage rates were converted into
2006 dollars by inflating them by 7.7%. For workers
under the $5.15 federal minimum, wage rates were
bottom-coded at $5.15 per hour. This procedure in
the March CPS yields a higher proportion of low-
wage workers than one would obtain in the Merged
Outgoing Rotation Groups. A key advantage of the
March CPS for our purposes is its comprehensive
questions on family income, which is important for
the poverty simulations. In addition, wages over
the course of an entire year reflect sporadic
temporary work and short jobs, both of which may
not be well captured in the ORG.
6. Yelowitz (2005a,b) finds significant effects of Santa
Fe’s citywide minimum wage. The unemployment
rate among less-educated workers increased, while
weekly hours fell. After adjusting the estimates for
the fact that only 55% of workers were covered
(because the $8.50 ordinance only affected firms with
25 or more employees), he estimates an elasticity of
-0.24. See http://www.SantaFeLivingWage.com for
these calculations.
7. Specifically, for each low-wage worker in the CPS, we
compute the percent change in the wage rate to
move that worker to the higher $6.50 wage floor.
Then we apply the -0.22 elasticity (or -0.30 in St.
Louis and Kansas City), to compute the percent
change in employment. Finally, we multiply the
result by the CPS sample weight to compute the
number of workers who lose their jobs and the
number who keep their jobs. Those new weights—
which add up to the initial number of low wage
workers—are used to compute the summary
statistics in Table 3. To illustrate, imagine a worker
in the CPS with a given set of characteristics who
initially has a wage rate of $5.50 per hour, lives in
St. Louis, and has a sample weight of 1,300 (meaning
that individual represents 1,300 people similar to
himself). In that case, the change in the wage rate is
18.2 percent (=6.50/5.50 - 1). Applying this percentage
increase in the wage floor results in a 5.5% reduction
in employment (the elasticity of -0.3 = -5.5%/18.2%).
Therefore, 72 of the 1,300 workers would lose their
jobs (multiplying the 5.5% employment reduction
by the sample weight of 1,300) and these 72 people
all have the same characteristics. We would apply
such a procedure for all low-wage workers, giving
one set of sample weights for job losers, and another
for job keepers. We then compute the summary
statistics for individuals we identify as losing and
keeping their jobs using the sample weights. A
similar approach is taken in MacPherson (2006).
8. When computing poverty rates for full-time, full-year
work, we imputed wage rates for non-workers with
a procedure suggested by Heckman (1979). We use
number of family members and number of children
to identify the model) in the third column. For such
workers, we bottom-coded predicted wages at $5.15
per hour.
9. This is the tax credit a worker would receive if they
had a spouse and two children, earned $5.15 an hour
and worked 2080 hours in the year.
10. See http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/TaxFacts/
TFDB/Content/PDF/eitc_parameters.pdf.
11. The official definition of poverty ignores transfers
such as the EITC when computing poverty rates.
The maximum credit in 2003 was $4,204 (Green Book,
2004, 13-38), and the average family credit was
$1,784. In 2002, the poverty rate would have fallen
from 12.1% to 8.2% if non-cash benefits (such as the
EITC) had been included (Green Book, 2004, Table
H-7, p. H-11).
12. See http://www.taxcreditresources.org/
pages.cfm?contentID=39&pageID=12&Subpages=yes.
13. See http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/06poverty.shtml
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The U.S. Economy in 2006:
 Mixed Signals
Jenny Minier
The U.S. economy grew at a moderate pace in 2006, despite slowdowns in the housing market
and manufacturing industries.  Strengths included stock market gains and low unemployment.
In this article, I discuss the economic events of 2006 and their implications for 2007.  I am
cautiously optimistic that the economy will continue to grow at moderate rates into 2007.
Introduction
The economy was filled with mixed signals
throughout 2006.  Although bad news in the housing
market and manufacturing industries (particularly
the auto industry) filled the headlines, the stock
market saw large gains in the second half of the year,
unemployment remained low, and falling gas prices
helped maintain consumer spending in the face of
falling housing wealth.
In addition, GDP growth was quite volatile over
the first three quarters of 2006, sending further mixed
signals.  In the first quarter, GDP growth as estimated
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis was at a
remarkably healthy 5.6% annual rate, seasonally
adjusted – quite a dramatic increase over the 1.8%
growth of the fourth quarter of 2005.  In the second
quarter, growth in real GDP slowed to a 2.6% annual
rate, due largely to a slowing of personal
consumption and exports and a large decrease in
residential fixed investment.  The slowing continued
somewhat in the third quarter, in which growth was
estimated at 2.2%, although this was significantly
above the advance estimate (released in October) of
1.6%.  (If the advance estimate of 1.6% had held, it
would have been the slowest growth rate in over three
years.) The continued deceleration, although smaller
than anticipated, was due mainly to a continued
decrease in residential fixed investment and
increased imports.  In October, the Bush
administration lowered its official forecast for GDP
growth to 3.1% in 2006 and 2.9% in 2007.  The
forecasts in June had been significantly higher, at
3.6% and 3.3%, respectively.
First, the Bad News, Part 1: the
Housing Market
The slowdown in the housing market was one
of the biggest stories in the U.S. economy in 2006.
After several years of rapidly appreciating home
prices, particularly in parts of the South and West,
sales stagnated for both new and existing homes.
Industry analysts expect both markets to be down
overall for the year, with existing home sales
predicted to fall by 9% and new home sales to fall by
17%.  In the market for existing homes, the number of
homes for sale nationwide increased from 2.8 million
in September 2005 to 3.7 million in September 2006,
indicating a large increase in the average time to sell
a property.  The situation is unlikely to improve
quickly, since housing starts (the number of
residential units on which actual construction – not
permits – began during the period) fell by 27% over
the year ending in October 2006, which is the largest
one-year decline since March 1991.  Figure 1
illustrates both of these sharp drops in housing starts
(monthly data at a seasonally-adjusted annual rate),
as well as the fairly steady upward trend between
1991 and 2005.
The general consensus seems to be that the
housing market peaked in August 2005, although
with only a few exceptions, most local markets have
seen only slight decreases in median prices.
According to the National Association of Realtors,
the median price of an existing home sold in October
2006 was $221,000, a drop of 3.5% since October 2005.
This was a record decrease, and significantly larger
than the previous record of 2.1% in November 1990.
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The record high median price of $230,000 was
reached in July 2005, and the current median is only
4% below that level.  This moderate decrease suggests
that – at least so far – there is no evidence that there
was a national “housing bubble,” (a “bubble” is said
to occur when increases in housing prices are due
purely to speculation and unrelated to
fundamentals).
The underlying reasons for the housing
slowdown are hard to pinpoint.  Realtors are inclined
to blame the media for highlighting the slowdown
and referring to a housing market bubble, leading
consumers to be more
cautious.  Although
interest rates have
increased fairly rapidly –
the Federal Reserve’s
interest rate target has
increased from 2.5% in
February 2005 to 5.25%
today (a target set in June
2006) – mortgage rates are
still near 45-year lows.
Figure 2 shows average
interest rates on 30-year
conventional mortgages
(the most commonly held
mortgage).  After a sharp
increase in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, the trend
has been steadily
downward, and the
increase over the last year or so
still leaves mortgage rates very
low by historical standards.
Although many
economists believe that the
worst of the housing slowdown
is over – indeed, the number of
homes sold in November
increased by 0.5% – the effects
on the economy may continue
for some time.  In early October,
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben
Bernanke referred to the
“substantial correction”
occurring in the housing
market, and predicted that the
slowdown would continue to
hurt the economy into the early
part of 2007.
The most direct effect of a weak housing market
on the economy is through reduced employment in
the construction industry and associated suppliers
(including the real estate and mortgage industries);
construction (including non-residential
construction) accounts for nearly 10% of U.S. GDP.
In addition, changes in housing wealth have
implications for consumption, since housing wealth
constitutes a significant part of the average
American’s holdings of wealth.  Although housing
is an illiquid form of wealth, people can access that
wealth fairly easily through instruments like home
Figure 1: Housing Starts
Figure 2: 30-Year Conventional Mortgage Rate
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equity loans and mortgage refinancing.  As a result,
the decrease in housing wealth (as well as the
associated reduction in perceived liquidity, as people
come to believe that it would take longer to sell their
home) has implications for consumption.  Several
recent studies find evidence that the effect of a change
in housing wealth on consumption is significantly
higher than a change in stock market wealth (see, for
example, Case, Quigley and Shiller (2005)).
The Bad News, Part 2: Autos and
Manufacturing
Demand for durable goods – large-ticket items
expected to last for at least three years – plunged in
October by 8.3%, according to the Commerce
Department.  Although this is the largest decline
since July 2000, it partly reflects a significant decrease
in commercial airplane orders, which had tripled in
September, allowing for an 8.7% increase in that
month. (Commercial aircraft orders, of course, are very
volatile from month to month.)  Durable goods orders
have either fallen or remained essentially unchanged
since July 2006, except in September.  Excluding
transportation, durable goods orders fell by 1.7% in
October.
Both Ford and General Motors have continued
to struggle this year. By the end of November, Ford
had already lost approximately $7 billion in 2006,
and forecasts a loss of around $10 billion on the year
as a whole (and expects to lose $17 billion more over
2007-2009); GM lost over $10 billion in 2005.  By 2007,
manufacturing employment at domestic auto
companies’ plants is expected to be 130,000 less than
in 2003.  Ford’s “Way Forward” plan called for 14
plants to be closed, and a reduction of 30,000 workers
(38,000 had accepted buyouts by November).  GM,
whose reduction in the workforce began earlier than
Ford’s, has announced that 35,000 U.S. workers –
nearly one-third of its hourly paid workers – have
accepted their buyout options, and is in the process
of closing 12 North American plants.
Now for the Good News, Part 1: The
Stock Market
One of the bright spots in the second half of the
year was the stock market.  In October, the Dow Jones
Industrial Average (DJIA) reached its previous closing
high of 11,750.28 (set in January 2000), and quickly
surged past 12,000 with a string of record-setting
closes.  The DJIA began the year at 10,739.75, and
climbed over 11,600 in May before falling back to
levels seen earlier in the year in June and July.  In
mid-July, however, the average began its climb
upward to record levels.
Other widely followed indices – the more broad-
based S&P 500 and the NASDAQ composite – were
both up approximately 10% for the year, although
(as of the end of November) the S&P 500 was more
than 10% below its March 2000 record, while the
NASDAQ composite was more than 50% below its
March 2000 peak.
The Good News, Part 2:
Unemployment
In other positive news, the unemployment rate
has trended downward for some time.  After
remaining at over 5% from September 2001 through
November 2005, the national unemployment rate has
stayed consistently below 5% since then, ending at
4.4% in October 2006.  This continues a downward
trend since the unemployment rate hit 6.3% in June
2003.  However, even here the news was somewhat
mixed: at the end of November, new claims for
unemployment benefits rose by 34,000 when they
were expected to fall by 9,000.  As of press time, it
was unclear whether this was a random fluctuation
or indicative of a trend upward in unemployment,
perhaps due to layoffs in construction and
manufacturing industries.
Interestingly, labor force participation rates have
also fallen since 2001, after increasing fairly steadily
since 1965, although not by enough to explain the
decrease in unemployment rates (someone who is
not actively looking for a job is considered to be not
participating in the labor market, and so is not
considered unemployed).  Although the decrease in
labor force participation has been small – the rate in
October was 66.2%, relative to a peak of 67.2% in
March 2001 – the rate has not risen above 66.5%
since November 2002.  Economists attribute this to
primarily three reasons: (1) the aging of the
population – although the oldest baby boomers have
not (quite) reached official retirement age, and they
are working more than earlier generations after age
55, labor force participation is generally lower
among older workers; (2) the increase in women
entering the labor force has slowed, and the
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percentage of women working has actually
decreased slightly from its peak in 1999; and (3) the
employment rate of teenagers (age 16-19) has fallen
dramatically.  The percentage of teenagers working
has fallen by approximately ten percentage points
since the 1990s (from over 50% to slightly more than
40%).
Aaronson et al. (2006) suggest that these are
structural changes, and that the trends are likely to
continue (with the possible exception of the baby
boom generation, whose labor force participation rate
is hard to predict).  Lower labor force participation
rates could have effects on potential GDP growth (the
growth rate at which output can expand without
increasing inflation), as a reduced workforce would
put upward pressure on wages.
The Good News, Part 3: Fuel Prices
By the end of November, the national average
price of a gallon of regular gas stood at $2.24, almost
exactly the level as of January 2006.  Gas prices had
remained elevated from April through the summer,
and peaked at an average price of over $3.00 during
August.  Although the sustained high gas prices have
had some effect on consumer behavior (for example,
high gas prices are one of the most common
explanations for the U.S. automakers’ recent troubles,
since Japanese and European cars tend to be more
fuel-efficient than American ones), the decrease in
gas prices since the summer months is also credited
with reviving consumer spending during the fall
months, and taking some of the edge off of concerns
about overall inflation.  On average, 3.6% of an
American household’s budget goes to gas and oil, a
figure that has been remarkably constant for decades
(Cambridge Energy Research Associates).
The Trade Deficit and the Value of
the Dollar
One aspect of the macroeconomy that has
multiple implications for the economy’s overall
performance in 2007 is our international position
with respect to international trade, net foreign
investment, and the value of the dollar.  The (monthly)
international trade deficit on goods and services
decreased to $64.3 billion in September 2006, after
reaching a record high of $69.0 billion in August,
while the much-discussed deficit against China
constitutes $23 billion of that.  This large trade deficit
has contributed to the falling value of the dollar: by
the end of November, the dollar had fallen against
the euro to a 20-month low of $1.318 per euro (in
January, it traded at $1.198 per euro).  The
depreciating dollar is largely due to concerns about
the size of the trade deficit: such a large trade deficit
is sustainable only as long as foreigners are willing
to purchase U.S. assets.  When a country runs a trade
deficit – importing more goods and services than it
exports – it must sell domestic assets to foreigners to
finance the difference.  As long as foreigners are
willing to purchase assets (real estate, financial assets,
etc.), this also allows the country running the trade
deficit to have investment higher than its domestic
savings levels, allowing for increased economic
growth.  Investment financed by foreigners has
benefited the U.S. tremendously over the last few
decades, allowing for higher rates of investment and
economic growth than would otherwise be possible
given very low U.S. savings rates (a combination of
high federal budget deficits and low personal savings
rates).  The falling dollar will, of course, have feedback
effects into the trade deficit: as the dollar decreases
in value, our exports become cheaper and imports
become more expensive to us, which should reduce
the size of the trade deficit.  Reducing the trade deficit
will also force the amount of net foreign investment
to decrease.
Inflation
On the inflation front, the Federal Reserve
aggressively raised its interest rate target from 2.5%
in February 2005 to 5.25% in June 2006.  Since then,
the Fed has not made any changes, although members
of the Federal Open Market Committee have
continued to hint that they are carefully watching
for signs of increasing inflation.  Statements toward
the end of the year by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben
Bernanke suggest that he will continue to monitor
inflation, even if GDP growth slows further.  In late
November, Bernanke stated that the risks to inflation
were “primarily to the upside,” causing second
thoughts among the many Fed watchers whose
predictions were that the Fed’s next move would be
a rate cut sometime in early 2007.
Although overall inflation has moderated as
energy prices have decreased since the summer, core
inflation (which excludes food and energy prices)
has remained relatively high.  Figure 3 shows both
measures as 12-month changes.  The solid line
represents the overall CPI, while dashed line is the
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core CPI.  Note that the large drop in the CPI in
September and October of this year primarily reflects
the high levels following Hurricane Katrina in those
months of 2005, due largely to significant increases
in fuel prices.
Housing costs make up nearly 40% of the core
CPI, so one might expect that the cooling housing
market would provide a damper on inflation.
Paradoxically, the opposite seems to be true.  Because
of concerns about the housing market, increasing
numbers of people are choosing to rent their homes
instead of purchase them.  This increased rental
demand has driven up rents.  In the construction of
the CPI, the cost of housing to people who own their
homes is imputed from rents on comparable
properties.  Although the actual cost of housing has
not generally changed, the imputed rent has actually
increased.  Some have argued that imputed rent
should be dropped from the CPI calculations because
of this sort of statistical anomaly (indeed, European
governments have done this), but such a significant
change in the computation of the CPI would not be
taken lightly.
Outlook for 2007
In short, the economy looks to continue on a path
of relatively low – but not negative – growth into
2007.  The Democrats newly in control of the U.S.
Congress are unlikely to make drastic changes to
Figure 3: Inflation, 12-month change
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
Ja
n-0
3
Ma
r-0
3
Ma
y-0
3
Ju
l-0
3
Se
p-0
3
No
v-0
3
Ja
n-0
4
Ma
r-0
4
Ma
y-0
4
Ju
l-0
4
Se
p-0
4
No
v-0
4
Ja
n-0
5
Ma
r-0
5
Ma
y-0
5
Ju
l-0
5
Se
p-0
5
No
v-0
5
Ja
n-0
6
Ma
r-0
6
Ma
y-0
6
Ju
l-0
6
Se
p-0
6
CPI Core CPI
economic policy: the
most high profile
economic legislation
will likely be an
increase in the federal
minimum wage to
$7.25, which incoming
House Speaker Nancy
Pelosi has vowed will
be passed within the
first 100 hours of the
Democrats taking
office in January.  (The
current federal
minimum wage of
$5.15 was established
in 1997, although many
states have higher
minimum wages.)  The
higher minimum wage
is unlikely to have a
significant overall impact on wage costs or prices, as
only about 5% of the U.S. labor force is directly affected
by the minimum wage.  In other legislation with
economic ramifications, the Democrats are likely to
be more protectionist with respect to trade policy,
and to try to target tax cuts more at the middle class.
They have also made fiscal responsibility part of their
campaign platform, although many of their proposals
would be expensive, and it is not clear how revenue
would be raised to fund them without increasing the
budget deficit.  Divided governments, however, are
often effective at introducing some discipline into the
budget process.  At any rate, the Democrats assuming
control of Congress in January is unlikely to cause a
significant change in course to the U.S. economy.
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Recent Economic Developments in the
United States and Kentucky:
 Implications for 2007
Christopher Jepsen
I. Introduction
The biggest headlines of the last couple of years
have been the War on Terror and volatile energy
prices.  Although the Gulf Coast hurricanes of 2005
added further, temporary volatility to energy prices,
they do not seem to have permanently altered the
national or state economy.  The once-robust economy
began to show signs of weakness late this year.  Thus,
the experts predict lower growth for 2007 than in
2005 and 2006.
The Kentucky economy is expected to behave
similarly to the national economy.  Historically, the
two economies behave similarly, although they have
begun to diverge slightly.  State GDP has grown more
slowly than the nation in 2004 and 2005, and
unemployment levels in the state have started to rise
even though national levels have continued to fall.
Due to these differences, state economic growth is
expected to be smaller than national growth in 2007.
II. Recent Trends in the U.S.
Economy
A. Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
The United States emerged from a recession in
late 2001.  Figure 1 illustrates GDP growth from the
beginning of 2003 through the third quarter of 2006.
As shown in the figure, real GDP grew steadily
throughout 2003 and 2004, with slower growth in
2005.  Growth slowed even further during the first
three quarters of 2006.
B. Labor Market Conditions
Although GDP began to grown in 2001, labor
market conditions did not improve until well into
2003.  Figure 2 shows the seasonally-adjusted
unemployment rate.  Despite GDP growth,
unemployment grew throughout the first half of 2003.
Since reaching a peak in June 2003 of 6.3%,
unemployment has fallen to 4.4% in October 2006.
This decrease is to nearly one-third of the June 2003
level, illustrating a substantial decline.
As expected, the drop in unemployment was
accompanied by an increase in payroll employment,
as illustrated by Figure 3.  Such an increase is not
automatic, as the unemployment rate excludes people
This article summarizes recent economic developments in the United States and in Kentucky.  It
covers the substantial growth in GDP over the last few years.  The article also looks at labor
market conditions, prices including energy prices, monetary policy, and housing conditions.
Economic conditions in Kentucky are also discussed.  The article concludes with forecasts for
both the nation and Kentucky.  The national economy is expected to grow by more than 2.0% in
2007, compared to growth in Kentucky of slightly less than 2.0%.
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Figure 1:  Real U.S. GDP 2003-I to 2006-III
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Figure 2:  U.S. Unemployment Rate
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who are not actively seeking employment.  Thus, the
unemployment rate can drop if more unemployed
people find jobs or if more unemployed people stop
looking for work.  The figure shows that more people
are finding jobs.  The labor force participation rates
have remained relatively constant in the past three
years (not shown).
C. Prices
With sizable increases in GDP and employment,
the Federal Reserve has worried about corresponding
increases in prices.  Table 1 shows recent inflation
rates, measured as the percentage change in the
yearly average Consumer Price Index (CPI).  The table
contains annual rates because there is considerable
month-to-month variation in the change in the CPI.
The inflation rate for all items averaged 2.3% in 2003,
but price pressures continued to rise in 2004 and
inflation increased at the rate of 2.7%. This trend
continued in 2005.  The price level jumped up for the
second half of 2005, due to the large increase in the
price of petroleum products in response to the Gulf
Coast hurricanes.  As petroleum produced returned
to normal at the end of the year, prices dropped
substantially.  Still, the average inflation rate for the
year was 3.4%.  In 2006, price increases have been
more modest, with an inflation rate of 3.1%.
The final column in Table 1 shows the
percentage change in the so-called “core” inflation
rate.  This tracks changes in the CPI less food and
energy.  The core inflation rate in 2003 was 1.4% and
rose to 1.8% in 2004.  It continued to rise in 2005 and
2006, with rates of 2.2% and 2.3%, respectively.
Although these prices do not explicitly contain energy
prices, energy costs are one set of input costs for
producing these goods and services.
How volatile have energy costs been?  Figure 4
shows crude oil prices since 2003.  There was a
strong, but somewhat erratic, uptrend in energy
prices even before the Gulf Coast hurricanes of 2005.
Crude oil prices rose from around $30 per barrel in
mid-2003 to nearly $55 per barrel in the summer of
2005.  Prices continued to climb in 2006, reaching
almost $75 per barrel in the summer.  However, prices
have fallen dramatically since then, with prices under
$60 a barrel in October.
D. Monetary Policy
The Federal Reserve began to worry about
inflation in 2003, as employment levels began to
increase and GDP continued to grow.  Before that
time, the Federal Reserve gradually lowered the
Federal Funds rate, reaching a historic low of 1% for
18 months starting in January 2003.
By the middle of 2004, the unemployment rate
had dropped to 5.4% although inflationary concerns
continued.  Consequently, the Federal Reserve began
raising the Federal Funds rate, starting in July 2003.
It has continued to raise rates steadily, so that the
Federal Funds rate is 5.25% as of November 2006.
Table 1: Recent Inflation Rates
All Items Less
All Items  Food and Energy
2001 2.8% 2.6%
2002 1.6% 2.4%
2003 2.3% 1.4%
2004 2.7% 1.8%
2005 3.4% 2.2%
2006 3.1% 2.3%
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Figure 5 contains the federal funds rate, the three-
month Treasury rate, and the 10-year Treasury rate
since 2003.  It shows the clear, upward movement in
the federal funds rate.  The three-month Treasury rate
has tracked the federal funds rate very closely.
Somewhat puzzling is the behavior of the longer term,
10-year Treasury rate.  Normally, long-term interest
rates move with short-term term rates.  However, the
10-year Treasury rate did not trend upward until
early 2006; since then, it has followed the short-term
rate and the Federal Funds rate.
E. Housing
Housing construction is another indicator of
economic well-being.  Figure 6 illustrates the number
of housing starts since January 2003.  Housing starts
increased in 2003 and 2004, although there were
sizable fluctuations in 2004.  The market leveled off
in 2005.  There was a spike in housing starts early in
2006, followed by a steady decline through August.
The housing market picked up slightly in September,
but fell dramatically to a four-year low in October.
The trend in new housing prices generally
followed the trend in housing starts.  Prices climbed
steadily from the start of 2003 through mid-2006.
Prices peaked in April 2006 and have been falling
since then, with a sizable decline between July and
September.  However, median new home prices
climbed substantially in October.  Existing home
prices fell more gradually over the same period.
II. The Kentucky Economy
The Kentucky economy tends to move closely
with the national economy.  For example, both the
state and national economies began their latest
economic recovery in 2001.  Specific aspects of the
state economy are discussed in more detail in this
section.
A. State-Level Gross Domestic Product
State-level GDP was formerly known as Gross
State Product.  Like the national GDP, state GDP
measures the value of goods and services produced.
The difference, of course, is that state GDP measures
state production rather than national production.
State-level GDP numbers are reported annually.
Table 2 reports recent GDP growth for Kentucky and
the nation.
Both the U.S. and Kentucky economies grew
sluggishly in 2001, with growth rates under 1%.
Kentucky actually grew noticeably faster than the
U.S. economy in 2002, with a solid growth rate of
3.0%.  Kentucky remained at the 3.0% level in 2004
and 2005, whereas the nation grew at 4.2% in 2004
and 3.6% in 2005.  Even though the national growth
rate declined between 2004 and 2005, Kentucky’s
growth rate remained constant.
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Figure 6:  New Residential
Housing Starts in U.S.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau
U.S. Kentucky
Table 2: U.S. and Kentucky
 Real GDP Growth
2001 0.9% 0.2%
2002 1.5% 3.0%
2003 2.6% 2.4%
2004 4.2% 3.0%
2005 3.6% 3.0%
Source: Federal Reserve Bank
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
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B. Unemployment and Employment
The U.S. and Kentucky unemployment rates have
generally trended downward over the past two and
a half years.  Figure 7 plots annual unemployment
rates for the U.S. and Kentucky from 1990 to 2005.
During this time period, the two annual rates are
nearly identical except for 2005.  During the most
recent recession, unemployment rates for both series
peaked in 2003 and subsequently declined.
Kentucky’s unemployment rate diverged from the
national rate in 2005.  Specifically, Kentucky’s rate
rose to 6.1% in 2005, but the national rate declined to
5.1%.  Preliminary data for 2006 (through October)
suggest that Kentucky’s unemployment rate
decreased slightly more than the national rate
decreased, but a sizable gap still exists.  Although
the 2005 increase is somewhat unexpected, the
general conclusion is that patterns of employment
and unemployment in Kentucky are much like those
in the rest of the nation.  Thus, despite unexpected
recent numbers, it is anticipated that Kentucky’s
unemployment rate will follow the national rate
pretty closely.
Figure 8 plots the percentage change in total
employment, both for the U.S. and for Kentucky.  The
two employment patterns are similar, although
Kentucky’s employment changes are more volatile
than the nation’s.  Thus, the upward trend in
Kentucky’s unemployment rate is not associated with
a dramatic decrease in employment, suggesting that
the unemployment numbers are unexpected.
C. Gas Prices
One concern, both nationally and in Kentucky,
is the recent volatility of gasoline prices.  Figure 9
displays the average gasoline prices for 2005 and
2006.  Gasoline prices were indeed volatile over this
stretch.  The Gulf Coast Hurricanes explain the spike
in prices in late 2005, but the spike in the summer of
2006 harder to explain.  It is generally attributed to a
host of factors including increased demand and
political unrest in North Korea and the Middle East
(particularly Lebanon and Iran).  The prices of
gasoline in Kentucky and in the country were
extremely similar throughout the period.  Prices were
slightly lower in Kentucky, likely due to lower
gasoline taxes.  Diesel prices displayed a similar
pattern, although diesel prices showed less volatility
than gasoline prices.
D. Housing
One concern with the Kentucky economy is the
recent softening of the housing market.  Figure 10
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Unemployment Rates (1990-2005)
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Figure 9: Nominal Gasoline Prices in
the U.S. and Kentucky
Sources: Kentucky Energy Watch, AAA, and Energy
Information Administration
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illustrates changes in housing permits, a useful
indicator of housing construction.  Although
Kentucky has more volatile changes in housing
permits than the nation, the state’s housing starts
follow a similar pattern to that of the nation.  Housing
construction is a volatile industry, so the large
fluctuations in the table are to be expected.1  Thus,
any potential softening of the national housing
market will affect Kentucky.
III. Conclusions
The national economy grew in 2006 at a slower
pace than 2005.  GDP growth was small in 2006, and
is expected to rise approximately 2.5% in 2007.  Labor
market conditions were generally favorable, although
unemployment is currently so low that further
reductions will likely be minimal.  Specifically,
unemployment will remain relatively constant in
2007, at a little under 5.0%.  Inflation has been sizable
in the last two years, largely due to summer spikes in
energy prices.  Barring future spikes, prices should
remain stable in 2007, with inflation around 2.5%.
The Kentucky economy generally follows the
national economy.  Although state economic trends
have begun to diverge slightly from the national
conditions, there is little reason to expect further
divergence.  Over time, GDP and labor market
conditions should mirror that of the nation.  Other
factors, such as gas prices and housing starts, already
look similar to the nation.  Given the slightly adverse
GDP and labor market growth, the forecast for
Kentucky is for growth of slightly less than 2.0%.
The state unemployment rate will likely be around
6.0%.
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Figure 10: Changes in U.S. and
Kentucky Housing Starts
Source: U.S. Census Bureau
Endnotes
1 National data are often adjusted for seasonal changes
in construction, but state data are not typically
adjusted.  The interpretations presented here assume
that any seasonality affects the nation and Kentucky
similarly.
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AIK Business Manufacturing
Confidence Survey
Vladyslav Sushko and Anna Laura Stewart
INTRODUCTION
The December 2006 Manufacturing Business
Confidence Survey is the fourth year of a merged
research effort between the Associated Industries of
Kentucky (AIK) and the University of Kentucky
Center for Business and Economic Research (CBER).
This year, CBER surveyed 1,860 manufacturing
establishments. The sample was constructed using a
Selectory® database compiled by Dun & Bradstreet,
which includes data on all U.S. businesses. Using
the Selectory® database, CBER surveyed all Kentucky
manufacturing establishments with 15 or more
employees. Collectively, these manufacturing
establishments employ over 252,100 people.
According to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, seasonally adjusted
manufacturing employment in
Kentucky in October  of 2006 was
256,000. This means that
manufacturing establishments in our
survey sample employ approximately
98 percent of all manufacturing
workers in the state. These businesses
also generate annual sales in excess of
$95 billion.
Map 1 illustrates Kentucky manufacturing
businesses’ distribution by area development districts
(ADDs). As expected, the manufacturing
establishments are most densely concentrated in the
area known as the “urban triangle,” defined by
Lexington, Louisville, and Cincinnati Metropolitan
Areas. On the map, this region is approximated by
KIPDA, Northern Kentucky, and Bluegrass ADDs.
This region is also well interconnected via I-64, I-71,
and I-75. The Western Kentucky region, except for
the Purchase ADD, also contains a significant
number of manufacturers. Here again transportation
plays a major role, as I-24, I-65, I-164 as well as
Bluegrass and Western Kentucky Parkways provide
major transportation arteries in and out of the region.
The Kentucky Manufacturing Business Confidence Survey is produced each year through the
joint efforts of the Associated Industries of Kentucky and the Center for Business and Economic
Research. The survey asks businesses to report on their actual performance over the past year and
to make predictions for the next year in areas such as employment, sales, profits, capital
expenditures, and industry production. Among other findings, the 2006 survey reveals that
growth remains strong but that inflation may be distorting business expectations regarding
future profits and capital expenditures. In 2006 hiring conditions were slightly higher than in
2005, and have come a step closer to the robust sales conditions. Both reported sales and hiring
conditions are at their highest since the survey began in 1999.  Future expectations in the
manufacturing sector also indicate that Kentucky manufacturers view their business conditions
more favorably than those of the entire industry. A substantial presence in the number of businesses
that do not expect additional growth in the next 12 months suggests that business conditions in
the Kentucky manufacturing sector are unlikely to improve any further during 2007.
Map1: Business Density
By Area Development District
Note: Only manufacturers with 15 or more employees were considered
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The survey asked
businesses to report on their
performance during the
past 12 months using a
number of economic
indicators such as
employment, sales, and
profits. Survey respondents
were asked to choose one of
the following options when
describing their business’s
performance according to
each indicator: decrease, no
change, or increase. The
survey also asked
businesses to indicate their expectations for the same
indicators for the next 12 months. Two hundred and
fifty five businesses responded and another 64
surveys were undeliverable resulting in a response
rate of approximately 14 percent.  Eighteen percent
of respondents were members of the AIK.
The survey respondents represent over $14.5
billion in 2005 sales and 22,752 jobs.  As expected,
the majority of manufacturers are located in counties
that have, or are next to, an interstate or highway
(especially if the Bluegrass and Western Kentucky
parkways are included as major highways) which
pass through or near most of the population centers
in the state.
STATEWIDE PERFORMANCE
For the majority of those surveyed, sales, capital
expenditures and profits have risen during 2006 and
a majority of businesses expect a continued increase
in 2007. Other indicators, such as employment and
industry production, have also been increasing or
have remained steady for a majority of the
manufacturing establishments who responded.
Maps 2 and 3 illustrate Kentucky’s manufacturing
sector performance by ADD in sales and employment
through a diffusion index. The diffusion index allows
one to compare changes where ‘no change’ is one of
the possible responses. The index is calculated by
adding the number of “increases” to half the number
of “no changes,” then dividing this sum by the double
of the total number of responses, and finally
multiplying the result by 100. Within the index, a
value below 50 suggests deterioration in sales or
employment over the period and a value above 50
implies a net-improvement in sales or employment.
Map 2 shows manufacturing sales performance
across the state by area development district (ADD)
through the diffusion index. Map 3 shows the same
relationship but for the employment index (hiring
conditions). Overall, 11 out of 15 ADDs register at
above 50 index points for both sales and employment,
confirming once again that Kentucky manufacturing
growth remains relatively strong. Comparing Maps
2 and 3 to Map 1 shows that manufacturing business
performance in Kentucky is not necessarily correlated
with business density. Although the Big Sandy ADD
has less than 100 manufactures, compared to over
300 in the Bluegrass ADD (see Map 1), it has on
average outperformed Bluegrass ADD in both sales
and employment during 2006. Maps 2 and 3 also
illustrate a significant performance gap across the
state between sales and employment. While 5 ADDs
exhibit stellar performance in sales (Map 2), only 2 of
them (Green River and Big Sandy) show similar hiring
conditions (Map 3).  On the negative side, Gateway
ADD has joined Kentucky River ADD this year with
sales performance below 25 index points. In addition,
Lake Cumberland ADD, whose hiring conditions
have registered at below 50 index points in the past,
has also shown a similar decline in sales during
2006. Combined with rise in both sales and
employment indexes overall (as will be shown in
detail in the next sections), the divergence in
manufacturing business performance illustrated by
the maps suggests that the overall growth in
manufacturing is not been distributed equally
throughout the state.
Map2: Sales Performance Index
by Area Development District
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Figure 1
Manufacturing Sector Performance in Selected Indicators
both sales and employment
indexes, at 71.9 and 63.1 index
points respectively, are at their
highest levels recorded by this
survey. The trend seen in Figure
1 is generally consistent with U.S.
GDP growth which leveled off in
2005 after a period of rapid
recovery from 2001 to 2004.
Another trend involves the gap
between sales and employment
indexes. As Figure 1 shows,
negative growth in the
manufacturing sector during
2001 was first reflected by the
drop in employment index.
Moreover, the gap between sales and employment
performance has widened over the period of recovery
from 2001 until 2004. This is consistent with national
labor market trend after 2001 called the “jobless
recovery.”  However, the 2006 data show a greater
relative increase in the employment index of almost
3 points compared to a more modest 1.2 point increase
in the sales index. Whether this increase will lead to
a convergence in sales and employment indexes, as
has been the case during the late 90’s, is not yet clear.
2006 CONDITIONS
Table 1 shows the reported performance of each
business indicator during 2006 for the Kentucky
manufacturing sector.  Sales show the largest increase
with 65 percent of survey respondents reporting an
HISTORICAL TREND
Figure 1 illustrates the reported performance of
Kentucky manufacturers in sales and employment
from the past 8 years through the diffusion index.
Sales and employment from all manufacturing
establishments in Kentucky are differentiated from
sales and employment from AIK members. That is,
the survey sample for the years 1999-2002 and 2005-
2006 includes both AIK and non-AIK members
whereas the survey sample for 2003-2004 includes
AIK members only.
When compared with past survey results, 2006
data indicate that following the post recession
recovery from 2001 through 2004 Kentucky
manufacturers have maintained steady growth in
both sales and employment through 2006. Currently,
Map3: Hiring Performance Index
by Area Development District
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increase in sales over the last 12 months. Fifty seven
percent of manufacturing establishments also
reported a rise in profits during the same period.  At
the same time, 21 percent and 25 percent reported a
decline in sales and profits, respectively.  These
numbers indicate a wide range in performance in
the manufacturing sector over the past year.  Both
sales and profits are largely dependent on past
production orders and therefore should be considered
lagging indicators.  Business indicators that
represent short-term future investments and have
more predictive power, such as employment and
capital expenditures registered slightly lower during
the past 12 months. Forty-five percent of
manufacturers have increased employment while 55
percent have either decreased or maintained
employment at the same level as in 2005.  In addition,
fifty two percent of respondents report an increase in
capital expenditures while forty one percent report
no change in this indicator during 2006.
Table 1
Conditions Past 12 Months
Decrease No Change Increase
Employment 19.3% 35.3% 45.4%
Sales 21.3% 13.7% 65.1%
Profits 25.4% 17.2% 57.4%
Capital Expenditures 7.3% 41.1% 51.6%
Industry Production 21.6% 29.5% 49.0%
Figure 2 shows a comparison of current
conditions with conditions reported in the 2005
survey.  Reflecting the steady growth of the Kentucky
manufacturing sector, the percentage of
manufacturers that report an ‘increase’ grew for every
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Figure 2
Comparison of Current Conditions with Previous Survey
business indicator.  Compared to the 2005 survey,
profits and capital expenditures show the most
significant changes with 7.3 percent and 8 percent
growth in the number of businesses that experienced
an ‘increase’ compared to last year. The percentage
point change in the number of businesses reporting
a rise in employment, sales, and industry production
was significantly lower with 1.7, 2.3, and 2.6
percentage points respectively.  Such a gap, which
exceeds 5 percentage points for most of these
variables, may in part be explained by a recently
accelerated pace of inflation. Since employment,
sales, and industry production are measured in
quantities of labor or output by most businesses, they
should be interpreted differently from profits and
capital expenditures, which are measured in dollars.
Given a 3.2 percent annual inflation leading up to
November 2006 it is likely that a number of
businesses would overstate their “real” profits and
expenditures, a story told by Figure 2. Thus, the
comparison of responses about current conditions
to the previous survey shows both the steady growth
of the Kentucky manufacturing sector and inflation
fueled by steadily growing national economy and
the rising costs of energy.
Expectations for 2007
     In previous surveys, the majority of businesses
have been optimistic about
the near future, and the
same is true for the 2006
survey as well. Table 2
shows the manufacturing
sector expectations for the
next 12 months in selected
business indicators.
Expectations from the 2006
survey remain optimistic
with 69 percent and 65
percent of manufacturing
establishments anticipating
further increase in sales
Table 2
Expectations Next 12 Months
Decrease No Change Increase
Employment 8.2% 47.7% 44.0%
Sales 7.8% 23.1% 69.1%
Profits 7.3% 27.9% 64.8%
Capital Expenditures 6.7% 43.7% 49.6%
Industry Production 15.6% 33.8% 50.6%
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and profits, respectively. Businesses are less
optimistic when it comes to employment, capital
expenditures, and industry production: 44 percent
of survey respondents anticipate further growth in
employment, 50 percent expect a rise in capital
expenditures, and 51 percent expect an increase in
industry production.  Since employment and capital
expenditures represent business investments in the
short term future, these indicators tend to
approximate the actual outcomes in the next 12
months more accurately than sales and profits
expectations, which tend to be overstated.
       Figure 3 is analogous to Figure 2 in the previous
section, except the same analysis is applied to future
expectations. As Figure 3 shows, business
expectations have changed differently since 2005
depending on the parameter in question. Positive
expectations for sales and capital expenditures have
grown by 1.7 and 3.0 percentage points respectively,
absorbing an equal share of negative and neutral
expectations from a year ago. Expectations for future
profits also show positive net change with a 4.0
percentage point decline in negative expectations
which translated into growth in neutral and positive
expectations of 2.8 and 1.2 percentage points
respectively. The opposite is true for expectations
about employment and industry production in the
next 12 months. Positive expectations for employment
have decreased by 3.4 percentage points translating
into a 3.2 percentage point growth in neutral
expectations and a slight growth in negative
expectations of 0.2 percentage points.  In addition,
negative expectations for industry production in the
next 12 months increased by 4.8 percentage points
and constitute the largest shift of any variable in
Figure 3.
Such varying
relative changes in
expectations for these
five business
indicator are
unusual, especially
because in the past
surveys expectation
changes for capital
expenditures and
industry production
have closely
resembled each other.
As in the case with
current conditions,
inflation may explain some of these differences.
Expectations for variables measured in dollars (i.e.
profits and capital expenditures) show an increase
on the positive side, while expectations for variables
measured in quantities of labor or output (i.e.
employment and industry production) exhibit a net
shift towards lower expectations. Comparing these
two opposite dynamics it is reasonable to assume
that some businesses overstate their profits and
capital expenditures by not properly accounting for
inflation. This in turn causes them to overstate
expectations for these business indicators as well,
leading to the opposing expectation shifts between
these variables and the employment and industry
production variables seen in Figure 3. We left sales
expectations out of this comparison, because whether
survey respondents measure sales in dollars or
output quantity is ambiguous given just the survey
results.
Accounting for the Expectation Bias
Historically, survey respondents tend to be overly
optimistic (albeit to varying degree) about the near
future. This implies that there exists a fairly constant
higher expectation bias among survey respondents.
This bias can be roughly approximated by comparing
reported business conditions from a given period
with the expectations for that period in a previous
survey. Calculating the expectation bias allows for
an approximation of business conditions in the
manufacturing sector in the next 12 months based to
these expectations.
Because the Kentucky manufacturing sector
entered the current phase of the business cycle during
2004 (see Figure 1), we estimate the expectation bias
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Figure 3
Comparison of Future Expectations with Previous Survey
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based only on survey years 2004 through 2006.
Taking the average of the differences between the
reported performance of each indicator in 2005 and
2006 with the expectation for that indicator in 2004
and 2005 respectively, yields the average error in
expectation for the 2 year period in percentage points.
Table 3 demonstrates how expectations for each
business indicator differ from the reporting on that
indicator the following period. Profits followed by
sales are the two most overstated variables in terms
of positive expectations with 11 and 6 percentage
point error on average. They are also the most
understated in terms of negative expectations, with
16 and 12 percent error on average. Expectations for
future employment and industry production on the
other hand tend to be more conservative, with
approximately 3 percent error on the positive side,
and thus closer to the actual reported performance of
these indicators.
Table 3
       Average Expectation Error (Bias)
Decrease No Change Increase
Employment -9.9% 6.7% 3.3%
Sales -12.4% 6.0% 6.4%
Profits -16.2% 5.5% 10.7%
Capital Expenditures 2.3% -5.0% 2.6%
Industry Production -10.0% 5.9% 4.1%
Subtracting the error terms in Table 3 from
expectations given in Table 2 yields the prediction of
Kentucky manufacturing sector performance in these
indicators during 2007 based on expectations alone.
We necessarily assume that survey respondents use
information about the economy and their business
to guide their expectations and are not merely
guessing. Figure 4 demonstrates expected changes
in each parameter analogously to Figures 2 and 3
based on these expectations while accounting for the
bias. Every business indicator except for industry
production is likely to slow in growth. Industry
production business indicator itself is likely to
decline. The share of manufacturers with neutral
performance is likely to increase by anywhere from
3.4 percentage points in sales to 7.4 percentage points
in capital expenditures. Figure 4 also shows that
survey respondents expect all of the increases in
neutral performances in 2007 to be driven mainly by
a fall in the share of businesses with current increases
in these parameters ranging from a 2.4 percentage
point fall in sales category to a 4.7 percentage point
fall in capital expenditures category. Combined, these
data indicate an expectation of a very slight
slowdown in growth in the Kentucky manufacturing
sector, but no major change in the overall business
conditions during the next 12 months. Lower
expectations for industry production compared to
other business indicators mean that manufacturers
generally view conditions in Kentucky more
favorably than the national industry conditions as a
whole.
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Figure 4
Expected Change, Next 12 Months
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CONCLUSIONS
The results of the 2005 Kentucky Manufacturing
Business Confidence Survey show that the
manufacturing sector remains strong and that survey
respondents have higher expectations for the
Kentucky manufacturing sector than for the industry
as a whole. Business performance, especially in sales,
has remained as high as in 2006, but is unlikely to
improve any further during 2007. Hiring conditions
have slightly increased compared to 2005, but are
unlikely to increase any further in 2007. Moreover,
the survey results indicate that manufacturers do not
expect hiring conditions to reach the same levels as
the sales conditions, as has been the case prior to
2000. Finally, business’ relatively high assessments
of growth in profits and capital expenditures without
the matching growth in sales, employment, and
industry production reflect the effects of inflation on
Kentucky’s manufacturing sector.
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